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ARTICLES
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FUTURE OF
PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE: REMOTE
RECORDING AND OTHER SEARCHES IN
PUBLIC SPACE
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ*
Public video surveillance is changing the way police fight crime and
terrorism. This was especially clear in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon
bombing when law enforcement found images of the two suspects by analyzing
surveillance images gathered by numerous public and private cameras. Such
after-the-fact video surveillance was equally crucial to identifying the culprits
behind the 2005 London subway bombing. But the rise of camera
surveillance, as well as the emergence of drone-based video monitoring and
GPS-tracking methods, not only provides an important boon for law
enforcement, but also raises a challenge for constitutional law: As police gain
the ability to technologically monitor individuals’ public movements and
activities, does the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable
searches” place any hurdles in their way?
In the 2012 case, United States v. Jones, five justices, in two separate
concurrences, signaled that it does—at least when the monitoring becomes too
intense or prolonged. Their suggestion, however, raises two significant
problems. First, it provides no principled basis for marking the point at which
public surveillance morphs from a means by which police monitor public space
* Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. B.A., 1989, Harvard College;
Ph.D. (Political Science), 2001, University of Chicago; J.D., 2001, University of Chicago.
Thanks to Danielle Citron, Susan Freiwald, David Gray, Jim Harper, Stephen
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into a Fourth Amendment “search.” Under the “mosaic theory” embraced by
the D.C. Circuit, such surveillance becomes a search only when it captures
enough data points from an individual’s public life to construct a detailed
picture (or “mosaic”) of her movements and associations. But how detailed
may such a picture be before it is too detailed? Do police engage in a search
simply by watching someone continuously, even if they do so without drones,
GPS units, or other advanced technology? Second, the concurring opinions do
not explain why the Fourth Amendment, if it does cover public surveillance of
this kind, does not also cover the information-collecting police do when they
simply watch a pedestrian or a driver. As Justice Scalia wrote in Jones,
“Th[e] Court has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere
visual observation does not constitute a search.” But if police collect the same
information from watching a driver as they do from tracking him with GPS
technology, why would their watching not also be a search?
This Article proposes a solution to each of these challenges by offering a twopart definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” in a public space. Police
engage in a search when they (1) not only observe, but also record, images or
sounds of people or events outside police presence; or (2) magnify details on a
person or documents or other items the person is carrying and thereby reveal
information that would not otherwise be apparent without a pat-down or a
stop-and-search of a person’s papers or effects.
This technology-based or design-based definition of what constitutes a
“search” avoids the problems that arise when the Fourth Amendment analysis
regarding what constitutes a “search” is based on an investigation’s duration
or intensity. Under the technology-based or designed-based definition, police
engage in a search as soon as they begin recording remote events or magnifying
otherwise invisible details, whether they have done so for two minutes or two
weeks. Additionally, under this approach, Fourth Amendment constraints
only apply to surveillance that goes beyond unadorned visual surveillance.
This test is more workable and more in accord with Fourth Amendment logic.
Recording is a search because, more than any other element of public
surveillance, it allows police to engage in dragnet-style investigation of all
activities in a public space. By transforming ephemeral occurrences into
permanent records, recording allows government officials to search public lives
frame by frame, much like they might search documents file by file. Certain
types of magnification could also constitute a search because, just as a
telescope focused on a home may be functionally equivalent to a home entry
and search, certain types of magnification may be functionally equivalent to a
physical search of persons, papers, or effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Public surveillance technology is changing the way police fight
crime and terrorism. This was clear in the aftermath of the Boston
Marathon bombing when law enforcement quickly found images of
the two suspects by “sift[ing] through a mountain of footage”
gathered by public and private cameras.1 It was also clear in the
aftermath of the 2005 London subway bombings, when the suspects
were quickly identified using video surveillance.2 Touting these
breakthroughs, cities have rushed to embrace camera systems,
especially in the years after the 9/11 attacks.3 Police in Washington,

1. Heather Kelly, After Boston: The Pros and Cons of Surveillance Cameras, CNN
(Apr. 26, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/26/tech/innovation
/security-cameras-boston-bombings/index.html.
2. ROY COLEMAN & MICHAEL MCCAHILL, SURVEILLANCE & CRIME: KEY APPROACHES
TO CRIMINOLOGY 99 (2011).
3. See Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of
Public Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 761–62 (2008) (explaining that “[p]olice
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D.C.;4 Chicago;5 and New York6 can now use camera networks to track
a person strolling down the street. They can magnify and video
record her movements, actions, and the details of her vehicle’s
license plate, or the items she is carrying out of a store.7 In fact,
government officials do not have to make do with cameras mounted
on lampposts or buildings. They can watch and record citizens from
drones that hover in the skies and glide at the command of a distant
operator to a new and better vantage point.8
This revolution in surveillance techniques not only provides an
important boon for law enforcement. It also raises an important
challenge for constitutional law. As police gain the ability to monitor
citizens’ public movements and activities with increasingly powerful
cameras, does the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
“unreasonable searches” place any hurdles in their way? Do police
need to obtain a warrant based on probable cause or to satisfy some
other constitutional test of reasonableness before they use a drone to
track a person’s movements or reconstruct those movements using
video footage from public cameras?

have praised video surveillance as an effective tool” and have increasingly employed
more sophisticated surveillance).
4. See Mary Beth Sheridan, D.C. Forging Surveillance Network, WASH. POST (May 1,
2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-05-01/news/36809706_1_securitycameras-closed-circuit-cameras-council-member (discussing centralization of the D.C.
surveillance camera system, which will integrate “4,500 cameras trained on schools,
public housing, traffic and government buildings” and allow “round-the-clock
monitoring of the closed-circuit video systems run by nine city agencies”).
5. See William M. Bulkeley, Chicago’s Camera Network Is Everywhere, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 17, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045384045745
39910412824756.html (“A giant web of video-surveillance cameras has spread across
Chicago, aiding police in the pursuit of criminals but raising fears that the City of Big
Shoulders is becoming the City of Big Brother.”).
6. See Greg Botelho, New York’s Times Square: Always a Target, Always Watched,
CNN (Apr. 25, 2013, 9:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/us/new-yorkboston-attack (noting that a “host of cameras” watches Times Square and other areas
in New York and that among them are cameras that “capture 360-degree images,”
“shoot from above,” or provide “ground-level surveillance footage”).
7. See, e.g., Chicago’s High-Tech Cameras Spark Privacy Fears, PHYS.ORG (Feb. 8,
2011) http://www.phys.org/news/2011-02-chicago-high-tech-cameras-privacy.htm
l#nRlv (“At least 1,250 of [Chicago’s cameras] are powerful enough to zoom in and
read the text of a book. The [camera] system is also capable of automatically
tracking people and vehicles out of the range of one camera and into another
and searching for images of interest like an unattended package or a particular
license plate.”).
8. See Tom Reeve, UAV Video Surveillance Drones Prepped for Take-Off, SECURITY
NEWS DESK (Feb. 2012), http://www.securitynewsdesk.com/2012/02/03/uav-videosurveillance-drones-prepped-for-take-off (“Drones . . . may soon be filling our skies,
engaged in myriad video surveillance tasks.”).
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Only a few years ago, most courts and lawyers would have answered
“no.”9 The Fourth Amendment protects people—and their “houses,
papers, and effects”—from being subject to “unreasonable searches
and seizures” by government officials.10 Supreme Court Justices as
well as legal scholars have generally interpreted this provision as
protecting individuals in the home, or some other space that is
objectively and reasonably private or personal.11
The Fourth
Amendment bars the government, for example, from spying upon
citizens in their living rooms and bedrooms; prying into their wallets,
purses, or other closed “containers”; and opening sealed envelopes or
closed drawers to read their private letters and diaries.12 More
generally, as Justice Harlan emphasized in Katz v. United States,13 the
government generally does not need a warrant any time it watches us,
but only when it observes us or examines our belongings after entry
into places or circumstances in which we have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”14
By contrast, the open and public space that we share with others—
in streets, public squares, and parks—is not a private environment.
We cannot exclude fellow citizens from this space nor command
them to close their eyes and ears to what is going on around them.
For example, when a person drives on a highway, she might be seen
or even followed by other drivers, and some of these other drivers
might be police officers. The Supreme Court held in United States v.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 274, 276 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding that GPS surveillance on public roads is not a search), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
1534 (2012) (mem.); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010)
(same); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010)
(same), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012) (mem.); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994,
998 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “activities already
visible to the public”).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (finding that,
while the Fourth Amendment limits police investigation of homes and the curtilage
surrounding the home, it has no application to “open fields”); Orin S. Kerr, Applying
the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1010
(2010) (explicating that the Fourth Amendment does not protect conduct that is out
in the open, while entering an enclosed space is usually a search).
12. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 598 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Every citizen clearly has an interest in the privacy of the contents of his
or her luggage, briefcase, handbag or any other container that conceals private
papers and effects from public scrutiny. That privacy interest has been recognized
repeatedly in cases spanning more than a century.”). As explained below, individuals
do receive Fourth Amendment protections from searches in the cars, purses, rented
lockers, or other areas in public space from which they can exclude outside
observers, but this does not give them protection from monitoring of their activities
in the open. See infra text accompanying notes 93–100.
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Knotts15 that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
their movements on public roadways.16 Thus, people cannot raise
Fourth Amendment complaints when their actions are open to the
public, including law enforcement officers, even if these officers use
hidden location-tracking devices or other technology to do so.17
While people may create some measure of constitutionally protected
privacy, even in public spaces, by closing their car doors or keeping
documents and other items inside a briefcase, purse, or some other
container,18 people cannot constitutionally shield the actions they
leave visible or audible. As one judge said in a recent Global
Positioning System (GPS) tracking case: “The practice of using . . .
devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within
the Court’s consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in that which they . . . leave open to view
by others.”19
Or so the Supreme Court and other courts insisted—until a year
ago. In the 2012 case of United States v. Jones,20 five Justices, in two
separate concurring opinions, indicated that it is time for a doctrinal
change.21
These five justices suggested that an important
constitutional line is crossed—and the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment are triggered—when public surveillance becomes too
intense or prolonged.22 Justice Alito, for example, argued that, while
“relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public
streets” is generally free from Fourth Amendment restriction, “use of
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
15. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
16. Id. at 281.
17. See id. at 282.
18. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 598 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(restating that all citizens have a clear privacy interest in the contents of personal
articles).
19. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012) (mem.).
20. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). In the case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department came to suspect a nightclub owner, Antoine
Jones, of drug trafficking and used multiple surveillance measures—including visual
surveillance and wiretapping—to gather more information. Id. at 948. The
government also obtained a warrant to attach a GPS device, within ten days of the
warrant’s issuance, to Jones’s vehicle while it was in the District of Columbia, but the
government attached the GPS after these ten days had elapsed and when Jones’s
vehicle was in Maryland rather than the District. Id.
21. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (positing that the Supreme Court
should consider revisiting some of the fundamental premises of Fourth Amendment
law in light of technological developments); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (illustrating that the majority’s reasoning was based on eighteenth
century tort law).
22. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito that
“longer term GPS monitoring” constitutes a search in most cases).
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impinges on expectations of privacy” and should constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.23
The justices did not, however, clearly identify how long or how
intense public surveillance must be to cross the constitutional
dividing line.24 They did not have to do so because the majority
opinion relied on a different rationale to require a warrant. The
majority emphasized that the installation of a GPS device on a car
prior to tracking was a trespass.25 Because the Supreme Court did not
hold that the tracking of public movements alone violated the Fourth
Amendment, it did not need to specify the point at which public
tracking may violate the Fourth Amendment.26 While this particular
instance of public tracking began with a “trespassory” planting of a
GPS device,27 other kinds of public surveillance—including most
forms of video surveillance—do not. The public street cameras that
capture a car’s movements, or those that do so from a drone
hovering overhead, do not require police to touch the car—let alone
alter it—to surveil its movements.28 When the Justices confront a case
like this, they may have to clearly delineate the constitutional
boundary line between a search and non-search.
This Article proposes a way to mark that line. It does not do so by
asking how long, or how intently, police focus on a particular person
or event, but rather by suggesting a different criterion. Whether
public surveillance is a search should depend not on duration or the
quantity of information gathered by a surveillance method, but
rather on that method’s nature or design.29 More specifically, public

23. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
24. Id. (noting that “[w]e need not identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of this vehicle became a search,” and that while tracking Jones clearly
qualified as a search, “[o]ther cases may present more difficult questions”).
25. Id. at 949 (majority opinion) (finding that by placing a GPS unit on Jones’s
car, “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information,” which is a clear example of a Fourth Amendment search).
26. Id. at 954 (stating that while “[i]t may be that [tracking Jones’s movements]
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy, . . . the present case does not require us to answer that question,”
and that there was no need to resolve the “vexing problems” regarding how long
tracking must be to constitute a search).
27. Id. at 949, 952–53 (finding that the government’s planting of the GPS on
Jones’s car was a physical intrusion amounting to a trespass and that the “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test”).
28. Id. at 953–54 (highlighting that visual observation is constitutionally
permissible).
29. I previously presented a somewhat different version of this proposal at the
2012 Privacy Law Scholars Conference forum, “From Jones to Drones.” See Marc
Jonathan Blitz, United States v. Jones—and the Forms of Surveillance that May Be Left
Unregulated in a Free Society, USVJONES B LOG (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com
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surveillance should count as a search when it takes one of two forms.
First, police engage in a Fourth Amendment search, even in public
space, when they are not merely observing but also recording images
or sounds of people. Additionally, the police must obtain these
images and sounds from events and people outside the recording
officer’s presence. In other words, the government does not conduct
a search whenever an officer simply turns on an iPhone camera or a
camcorder and then records what is happening in front of him.
Rather, a public search occurs when recording technology allows
officials to record events that they would otherwise not be able to see
or hear.30 Second, a search can also occur in public when police
magnify and observe details on a person, or the documents or other
items she is carrying, so as to reveal information that would not
otherwise have been apparent without a pat-down or some other stopand-search of a person’s papers or “effects.”31
Such a technological form-based or design-based test,32 avoids the
key difficulty that plagues an approach that tries, in Justice Alito’s
words, to exempt “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements” from Fourth Amendment restriction, but places
constitutional limits on “longer term GPS monitoring” or other
surveillance in public.33 It spares the courts the task of seeking some
elusive or arbitrary point in the duration or intensity of a search at
which such monitoring morphs from being just another means by
which police watch over public space into a possible violation of the
Constitution.34 After police begin recording events outside of their

/2012/06/04/united-states-v-jones-and-the-forms-of-surveillance-that-may-be-leftunregulated-in-a-free-society (“[W]hat is important is not the quantity or nature of
information actually captured by surveillance, but rather the nature or form of the
surveillance technique itself.”).
30. See infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 124–129 and accompanying text.
32. Other scholars have also proposed their own distinct versions of such a
technological form-based or design-based test for what might count as a search in
public. See, e.g., David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Technology-Centered Approach
to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5, 25–41),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129439; Susan
Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 50–
70 (setting forth a four-factor test for determining whether new surveillance methods
constitute a search) [hereinafter Freiwald, First Principles]; Susan Freiwald, The Four
Factor Test, USVJONES BLOG (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/thefour-factor-test [hereinafter Freiwald, Four Factor Test] (questioning what the Fourth
Amendment test for GPS tracking should be); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing
these approaches in more detail).
33. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment).
34. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 313, 325, 333–34 (2012) (analyzing the difficulties in applying the “mosaic
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presence, it does not matter whether they do so for two minutes or
two weeks. Police engage in a search simply by using technology with
the capacity to create a record of people’s movements and aiming it
at certain individuals. Defining searches in public spaces in this
manner parallels the way that courts typically define Fourth
Amendment searches in private spaces. Police are immediately
bound by the Fourth Amendment when they enter a person’s house,
open up and flip through the pages of a diary, or tap a phone line.35
These investigations do not become a search only after they have
lasted a certain length of time; rather, the search begins with an entry
or intrusion, even if the stay or investigation lasts only seconds or
minutes.36 To be sure, the brevity of a search may, in some cases,
make it more likely to count as a “reasonable” and permissible
search.37 Nevertheless, brevity alone cannot transform such a search
into a non-search that is entirely free from Fourth Amendment
restriction.
The same should be true of public surveillance
technologies that involve remote recording or magnification of
details normally invisible without a physical search of a person, her
documents, or the items she is carrying.
Courts obtain a second advantage by focusing on the nature or
design of the investigatory method: The proposed test avoids
transforming all police monitoring into a constitutional matter. As
Justice Harlan wrote in a 1971 dissent, there is a constitutionally
significant difference between monitoring and recording.38 When
the government audio records someone’s words, it does something

theory,” which is a Fourth Amendment approach under which investigatory actions
that do not count as a search in isolation count as a search when aggregated).
35. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[T]here is certainly
no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the
front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule floor.”);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (stating that, except in exigent
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant as soon as
they cross the “line” that marks the entrance to the house).
36. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (stating that searches, no
matter how brief, must be based on probable cause).
37. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (holding that police stopand-frisk searches, while entailing a search and seizure, require only “reasonable
suspicion” and not a warrant or probable cause partly because they, unlike arrests,
constitute “a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion”).
38. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785–86 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the plurality ignored the differences between third-party monitoring
and recording); see also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of
Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 270 (2002) (taking note, but
expressing doubt, that the Supreme Court would accept the argument that although
“we assume the risk that others will view our public conduct, we do not assume the
risk that our public actions will be reduced to a photograph or film”).
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far more invasive than simply listening to them.39 It creates a record
that not only is “free of the possibility of error and oversight that
inheres in human reporting,” but also allows officials to review a
person’s life in far more detail than they could if they relied only on
the fading memories of listeners.40
The lesson of Harlan’s contrast is not that recording requires
constitutional oversight simply because it reduces our privacy to a
greater extent than mere listening or watching. Rather, it is that
recording changes the nature of police surveillance in such a way that
it threatens privacy as well as other Fourth Amendment interests
more deeply. Consider video recording. Such recording does not
necessarily reduce an individual’s privacy at the time it occurs: if no
one watches the video footage, as it is recorded or afterwards, then
the actions captured in the tape remain just as private as they would
be had no one seen or captured them.41 If an officer does watch the
scenes captured by the cameras, then an individual’s privacy is
compromised to some extent—but the fact that recording is
occurring does not make that officer’s live observation any more
intrusive than it would otherwise be.
Even unmanned recording, however, raises a significant threat to
Fourth Amendment purposes. It takes ephemeral occurrences in our
lives and transforms them into permanent records. Through
recording technology of this sort, the government can scan its
collection of footage of any person’s minute-to-minute activities in
hopes of finding something incriminating. Recording, in other
words, potentially allows the government to trawl through digital
images and audio records in search of evidence that justifies
subjecting individuals to state power. Such probing is precisely the
kind of dragnet-style investigation that the Fourth Amendment is
supposed to restrict42—and does restrict at roadblocks and airports.
39. Cf. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (elaborating that thirdparty bugging “undermine[s] th[e] confidence and sense of security in dealing
with one another that is characteristic of individual relationships between
citizens in a free society”).
40. See id. at 787–89 (indicating that allowing government officials to monitor
private conversations through a willing third-party assistant would compromise the
unhindered discourse “that liberates daily life”).
41. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 1418 (2001) (“Being observed by an insect
on the wall is not invasive for privacy; rather, privacy is threatened by being
subject to human observation, which involves judgments that can affect one’s life
and reputation.”).
42. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that “dragnet techniques” are at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on invasive searches).
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At such checkpoints, police have limited authority to make
suspicionless stops (and searches) to assure safety in these
transportation channels. What they may not do under the Fourth
Amendment is search for other evidence of crime that such a
chokepoint is able to strain out.43 But a dragnet that catches
thousands of travelers or other citizens is not the only kind of
sweeping investigatory technique that offends Fourth Amendment
purposes. For example, dragnet investigations under which officers
rummage through possessions or drawers of documents without
justification also offend these purposes, even when the hunt for
unknown contraband occurs within a single home and focuses on the
property of a single homeowner.44
A government “fishing
expedition” should likewise be deemed to be subject to Fourth
Amendment constraints when the data that officials sift through
comes not from personal documents, but from the trail of data
people leave behind in a world in which every action or movement is
recorded for potential review at a later date.45
To be sure, public surveillance can threaten Fourth Amendment
purposes, even when police are not recording what they see. Police
can use telescopes or extremely powerful zoom lenses to scrutinize
details on a person’s clothing, or on items or documents removed
from a wallet or briefcase, that would be invisible even to bystanders
just a few yards away.46 Certain courts have suggested that such
telescopic magnification would constitute a Fourth Amendment
search when pointed at the windows of a home,47 and if that is true, it
is certainly possible that telescope-aided scrutiny should also be a
43. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000) (striking
down as unconstitutional a road block program under which police investigated each
car not only for drunk drivers but also for evidence of drug-related contraband);
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 1974) (expressing concern
about “the possibility that the purpose of the airport search [to prevent terrorism]
may degenerate from the original search for weapons to a general search for
contraband”); see also infra notes 162–167 and accompanying text.
44. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (recognizing that the
Fourth Amendment forbids “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s
belongings” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971))).
45. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1349, 1407 (2004) (analogizing “mass video surveillance of law-abiding
citizens” to “unrestricted house-to-house searches” that the Fourth Amendment
clearly prohibits).
46. See id. at 1377.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The
vice of telescopic viewing into the interior of a home is that it risks observation not
only of what the householder should realize might be seen by unenhanced viewing,
but also of intimate details of a person’s private life, which he legitimately expects
will not be observed either by naked eye or enhanced vision.”).
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search when it is aimed at the other subjects of Fourth Amendment
protection—namely, an individual’s “person, . . . papers, and
effects.”48 High magnification of a detail on a person or her property
may thus, like recording, bring police observation in public onto
Fourth Amendment territory.
That such public surveillance is a Fourth Amendment search does
not mean that it will always be a Fourth Amendment violation. A
search of a house, person, paper, or effect is prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment only when it is “unreasonable.”49 Just as police, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, and other law enforcement
officials frequently use wiretaps by obtaining a warrant or absent such
a warrant when circumstances make a wiretap reasonable,50 police
should be able to capture and examine video records or to closely
magnify details of public action when use of these methods count
as reasonable.
Part I of this Article discusses why courts have found the Fourth
Amendment analysis of public surveillance to be so challenging and
describes how they have thus far met this challenge. Part II offers a
new test for determining when public surveillance constitutes a
search: the government’s actions require Fourth Amendment
scrutiny when it records remote events or uses an analogous method
of investigation, or, in certain instances, when it employs
magnification or sound amplification in a public space. Other kinds
of police surveillance in public generally are not searches, even if
they employ sophisticated technology. Part III explains why this
approach is preferable to various alternatives that scholars, and
judges themselves, have considered as they have struggled with how
Fourth Amendment law should apply in public. In the course of
doing so, Part III describes why police officers will be able to use
video surveillance technology, even without a warrant, so long as the
police meet Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards that assure
the technology is not used in a way that unnecessarily diminishes
individuals’ freedom from state monitoring.

48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. See id.; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 11-6493, 2013 WL 1759941, at *5–6
(6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2013) (affirming the district court’s ruling that a wiretap was
permissible because the government proved it was necessary, and the affidavit in
support of the intercept order was based on sufficiently reliable evidence).
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THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE SUPREME COURT’S INITIAL
STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION
A. The Problem of Public Surveillance

Whether public video surveillance is a search may seem deceptively
simple. Since 1967, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule from
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, under which the government
engages in a Fourth Amendment search any time it intrudes upon an
“expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”51 Members of a free society do not expect to be subject
to continuous government surveillance, even as they walk or drive on
public pathways. As a result, this kind of surveillance should be
subject to constitutional limits. Not only do many Americans share
this expectation,52 but they also likely view it as reasonable and
justified, as was clear in the legislative reaction to law enforcement
officials’ increasing use of drones. The Florida legislature, for
instance, recently enacted a law tightly restricting the use of drone
surveillance within the State’s borders: the Freedom from Unwanted
Additionally, some U.S. Senators and
Surveillance Act.53
Congressmen have suggested that federal restrictions might also be
justified because, as Senator Chuck Grassley explained, “[t]he
thought of government drones buzzing overhead, monitoring the
activity of law abiding citizens, runs contrary to the notion of what it
means to live in a free society.”54
But the task of fitting public surveillance into Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is, for a number or reasons, more challenging than
simply taking note of these intuitions. First, there is the line-drawing
problem that confronted the concurrence-writers in Jones.55 While it
51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. See Jim Gold, Poll: Americans OK with Some Domestic Drones—But Not To Catch
Speeders, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news
/2012/06/13/12205763-poll-americans-ok-with-some-domestic-drones-but-not-tocatch-speeders?lite (describing polls indicating that Americans support drone use for
certain security operations, such as securing the border or for “search and rescue”
operations, but that 67% oppose the use of drones to issue speeding tickets, and 64%
describe themselves as “somewhat concerned” or “very concerned” about drones’
effect on their privacy).
53. See Joe Sutton & Catherine E. Shoichot, Florida Gov. Rick Scott Signs Law
Restricting Drones, CNN (Apr. 28, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25
/us/florida-drone-law/index.html (describing Florida’s Freedom from Unwanted
Surveillance Act, which restricts the use of police drones within Florida’s borders).
54. Brendan Sasso, Senators Fear Drones “Buzzing Overhead,” HILL (Mar. 20, 2013,
3:06 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289337-senatorsworry-about-domestic-drone-surveillance.
55. See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text (detailing that the
concurrences identified the problem but not a solution).
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may seem clear that the continuous, suspicionless video recording by
hidden government cameras is at odds with a free society, this is not
necessarily true of all cases in which police officers watch a person
they deem suspicious,56 tail a car for a period of time,57 or observe a
How then, are we to
person with low-powered binoculars.58
distinguish between permissible, garden-variety watching, and
intensive surveillance that offends constitutional principles?
Such problems in drawing Fourth Amendment boundary lines
have recently haunted the efforts of courts to resolve the question of
whether (and how) the Fourth Amendment applies to police use of
GPS surveillance. As noted above, the Supreme Court concurrences
in Jones found that location tracking is a search only if it lasts a
sufficient amount of time, but did not specify how long is too long.59
In the lower court opinion in Jones, when the case was known as
United States v. Maynard,60 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit tried to provide an answer to this question by comparing GPS
tracking’s incremental intrusions into a person’s privacy to what
happens when the government assembles pieces of a person’s history
as though it were piecing together a jigsaw puzzle or “mosaic.”61 To
demonstrate this point, the D.C. Circuit noted that while the fact that
a person stops at a gynecologist office at one moment may itself tell
an observer very little, when police piece this fact together with
another GPS reading showing, for example, that she has also stopped
at a baby supply store, they can construct a detailed picture of her
daily routine and likely infer something about why she followed the
path she did (she is pregnant).62 But this mosaic theory approach
merely begs the questions it is intended to answer: how detailed a
picture is too detailed, and how many data points may police collect
before they enter constitutional territory?

56. See, e.g., Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (finding that a police officer did not conduct a search under the Fourth
Amendment when he “followed [individuals] in his squad car as they drove on
Boone County roads and sat outside businesses that [they] patronized”).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f
police follow a car around, or observe its route by means of cameras mounted on
lampposts or of satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search.”).
58. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on
Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 531, 550 (2007) (“Presumably a law enforcement agent could use a
flashlight or a set of binoculars without needing a warrant . . . .”).
59. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
60. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945 (2012).
61. See id. at 562.
62. Id.
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Judges are unlikely to provide consistent answers to these
questions. This was evident in the case of United States v. CuevasPerez,63 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
attempted to apply the D.C. Circuit’s Fourth Amendment analysis
without expressly endorsing it.64 The majority concluded that
Maynard’s “mosaic” rule simply did not apply to the facts before it
because the police had followed Cuevas-Perez for sixty hours, not
for twenty-eight days as in Maynard, and had tracked his
movements on a “single journey,” rather than on multiple trips.65
The dissent, by contrast, pointed out that monitoring of the
defendant on a “60-hour odyssey across 1,650 miles” is far from the
kind of brief trip that might be too insignificant to require Fourth
Amendment constraints.66
The problem is that no apparent principle explicates whether, or
why, sixty hours is short enough to remain free from Fourth
Amendment restraints. After all, if the danger raised by ongoing GPS
surveillance is that it allows police to “connect the dots” of a person’s
movements and draw inferences about her private plans, a sixty-hour
period is probably sufficient time to draw such a connection and
make inferences based on the data gathered.67 To take the D.C.
Circuit’s own example from Maynard, a woman’s visit to a baby supply
store may certainly come within sixty hours of her visit to a
gynecologist; thus, observers will hardly need twenty-eight days, or
even a week, to learn details about that woman’s life that are unlikely
to be apparent to others in public space. This uncertainty about how
much police can learn in a day, or a week, also provides reason to
question the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion that Maynard’s
mosaic theory should not apply to GPS tracking that lasts less than a
week.68 It is not clear that a week-long monitoring period is short
enough to avoid the dangers of aggregated information that
concerned the D.C. Circuit.69
The Fourth Amendment line-drawing challenge courts face in
public spaces is, in many ways, analogous to the one that Professor
Orin Kerr recently addressed in proposing a Fourth Amendment
63. 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012) (mem.).
64. See id. at 274.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 293 (Wood, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 292–93.
68. See Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 291 n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that there was no search or seizure when the police installed a GPS device
on the defendant’s work van when it was parked in public and used the GPS to track
the van while on public streets), aff’d, 732 S.E.2d 4 (Va. 2012).
69. See id.
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regime for Internet communications.70 As Kerr pointed out, the key
problem in determining whether Internet surveillance constitutes a
search is that the natural marker that generally delineates what
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search in physical space—namely,
the distinction between an enclosed, private space and an observable,
“The
public environment—does not exist on the Internet.71
distinction between government surveillance outside and government
surveillance inside,” Kerr writes, “is probably the foundational
distinction in Fourth Amendment law” because the government does
not need any cause or order to conduct surveillance outside,” but
“entering enclosed spaces ordinarily constitutes a search that triggers
the Fourth Amendment.”72 However, the Internet does not fit nicely
into this model because there is no outside/inside division to rely
upon. Everything on the Internet is considered to be enclosed and
inside.73 Kerr therefore argued that Fourth Amendment law needs a
new, functionally equivalent distinction to mark the boundary
between searches and non-searches.74 He proposed that courts
should rely on the distinction between content and non-content in emails or other Internet communications.75 When investigators
intercept and read the contents of a person’s e-mail, for example,
they are conducting a Fourth Amendment search and must first
obtain a warrant or otherwise show their search is reasonable.76
Conversely, when investigators merely want to look at the address
information on the e-mail, they are doing the equivalent of
looking at the outside of an envelope, not the letter inside, and
this monitoring of non-content information is therefore not a
Fourth Amendment search.77
If Internet surveillance raises a Fourth Amendment problem
because everything is “inside,” public surveillance raises a similar
problem because everything is outside. Public surveillance is “public”
because it focuses on the outside world and, more specifically, on
visible behavior in it. Here too, then, Fourth Amendment law needs

70. See generally Kerr, supra note 11.
71. Id. at 1009–10.
72. Id. at 1010.
73. Id. at 1012.
74. See id. (“The inside/outside distinction no longer serves the basic function in
the Internet setting that it serves in the physical world.”).
75. Id. at 1007–08.
76. Id. at 1020.
77. Id. at 1019; see also Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in
Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2115–16 (2009) (proposing, based on case
law, the existence of a content/non-content distinction between searches and nonsearches in Internet communications).
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a replacement for the outside/inside distinction. It needs a new
boundary line to demarcate parts of the outside world that deserve to
be treated like inside spaces for Fourth Amendment purposes—parts
of our life in public that, like our living rooms and bedrooms, deserve
to be constitutionally insulated from government scrutiny.
The lack of a replacement for the outside-inside distinction in
public space leaves judges without a key resource for determining
what counts as a search in public space. Without such a line, it is
difficult for courts to pronounce long-lasting public surveillance to be
a search on the basis that certain forms of it seem disturbingly
intrusive.78 These intrusions do not, by themselves, tell us how to
distinguish investigations that are invasive enough to require
constitutional oversight from those that are not.
There is a second difficulty in treating public surveillance as a
search: if courts subject police to significant constitutional limits in
monitoring public space, they risk crippling law enforcement’s efforts
to do what it is charged with doing. Police are not only generally as
free as other citizens to watch the streets they patrol, they are dutybound to do so. So it seems counterintuitive to require police to
obtain a warrant before showing the vigilance they are required to
show as a condition of their work.
One might suggest that courts should impose Fourth Amendment
requirements only on focused investigations of public space and not
on casual observations that police make while on patrol. But even
this approach arguably restricts police too tightly. Because law
enforcement is generally barred from conducting warrantless
investigations of homes and other private spaces, it needs to begin an
investigation somewhere else—in the public space outside of the
home. As the Supreme Court noted in California v. Ciraolo,79 in order
to obtain the probable cause required to obtain a warrant, police
must begin investigating and collecting evidence before they have
probable cause.80 Thus, there needs to be some place to start.81 In
short, if courts and scholars extend Fourth Amendment protection
beyond homes, private drawers, and journals into the realm of public
and visible activity, they have to recognize that they are extending it
into a realm that is, in many ways, and to a far greater extent than the
78. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that rapidly advancing technology will continue to alter the method of
Fourth Amendment analysis).
79. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
80. Id. at 213.
81. Id. (postulating that the chance to make observations from the public space is
“precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant”).
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activity in a home or other private environment, very much the
government’s business.
Effective investigation, moreover, often requires police to take
advantage of new surveillance technologies. As the Seventh Circuit
noted in an earlier GPS case, the Fourth Amendment “cannot
sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the
twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”82
B. A Simple, but Flawed, Position: Treating Open Areas as a
Fourth Amendment Free Zone
One possible response to such concerns is to err, at least in public
spaces, on the side of giving government all of the room it needs to
conduct investigations. In short, we might simply adopt the rule that
surveillance of what is visible and public never constitutes a search.
In applying the Fourth Amendment to public space, in other words,
we might conclude that we do not need a substitute for the
outside/inside distinction because that dichotomy itself provides a
simple and satisfactory answer: everything that is left visible and
audible in the outside world is “outside” and therefore may be
observed by the government free from constitutional restraint.83
At least on the surface, this is the approach that the Supreme Court
has taken to public investigations so far (or at least until its 2012 Jones
decision).84 The Court has allowed the government to track the
movements of automobiles with radio transmitters, for example, so
long as the tracking occurs “on public thoroughfares” and does not
extend inside the home.85 It has permitted officials to observe the
property of a factory, and even the outskirts of private homes, from
planes and helicopters in “public airspace” where the public has a
right to be and observe what is around it.86 In fact, decades before
82. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
83. For an argument largely favoring such a position, see Heidi Reamer
Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy in Public, 7
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2012).
84. See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (restating that what an individual knowingly
exposes to the public is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (holding that
investigatory actions do not constitute a search when they are observing that which
can be seen by the public); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
(explaining that traveling over public streets voluntarily conveys information to
anyone who might be watching with the naked eye or with the assistance of
technology).
86. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212–13 (holding that investigators do not violate the
Fourth Amendment when they observe property from public airspace and members
of the general public flying overhead could make the same observation); Dow Chem.
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (finding that the Environmental
Protection Agency’s fly-by assessment of an industrial complex to observe whether it
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radio transmitters and chartered planes became a common feature of
everyday life, the Supreme Court—in a 1924 decision written by
Justice Holmes—made clear that “the special protection accorded by
the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses,
papers and effects’ is not extended to the open fields.”87 The “open
fields” doctrine later seemed to some to be at odds with the Court’s
holding in Katz, in which the majority held that electronic
eavesdropping is a Fourth Amendment search even when it targets
someone making a call from a public phone booth on a street.88 The
Katz majority had called into question the notion that everything we
do in public may be monitored free of constitutional restraint,
declaring that what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”89
But the Supreme Court later made clear that the open fields
doctrine remains a central part of the Fourth Amendment law. In
Oliver v. United States,90 the Court squarely rejected a property owner’s
claim that the police had violated the Fourth Amendment when they
located a marijuana field on his land.91 Unlike a realm where
individuals might reasonably expect privacy, said the Court, “open
fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance.”92 Courts have understood this “open fields” doctrine to
mean that police are free to observe not only what is visible in a field,
but also what they can see in public streets and roads.93
Such an approach still leaves individuals with an opportunity to
find sanctuaries for privacy in public space, but only when they find
pockets of “inside” space somewhere in the public, visible world.
People might, for example, hide items they bring onto a street within
a purse or briefcase. They might keep confidential conversations
secret by engaging in them only from a closed phone booth94 or from
was in compliance with environmental regulations did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search).
87. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also, Bruce G. Berner, The
Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 390 (1991)
(recalling that many commentators predicted that Hester’s open-field doctrine would
no longer be applicable after Katz).
89. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
90. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
91. See id. at 173, 182–84.
92. Id. at 179.
93. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986).
94. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (finding the government engaged in a search
when its eavesdropping invaded “the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth”).
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behind the locked doors and closed windows of an automobile.95 It
was this kind of privacy in public that the Supreme Court endorsed
and protected in Delaware v. Prouse96 when it emphasized that “people
are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step
from their homes onto the public sidewalks” or when “they step from
the sidewalks into their automobiles.”97 Even on public streets,
drivers remain protected from having their cars arbitrarily stopped
and searched,98 and pedestrians are protected from being stopped
and frisked for weapons unless an officer has “reasonable” suspicion
that they are involved in criminal activity.99 But these types of Fourth
Amendment protections only shield what is inside of one’s car or
inside of one’s pockets. They do not limit a police officer’s freedom
to observe the outside of the car or its movements, or to scrutinize
the outside of a person’s jacket.100
There are a number of advantages to this bright-line rule that
denies Fourth Amendment protections to observations that are
visible to the public. One is that it keeps Fourth Amendment law
consistent with the classic principle of search and seizure law,
enunciated in the 1765 case of Entick v. Carrington,101 that “the eye
cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass.”102 While this English case
antedated the enactment of the U.S. Bill of Rights in 1791, it was
familiar to the Framers and was an important inspiration, and source
for, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.103
Its assumption that
officials do not commit an unreasonable search simply by looking at
what they can see has become a key principle in that jurisprudence.104
95. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658–59, 663 (1979) (holding that
stopping an automobile and requesting the driver’s license and registration involves
a search and is only permissible under the Fourth Amendment where there is
reasonable, articulable suspicion to do so).
96. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
97. Id. at 663.
98. See id. (requiring that officers may only stop and detain motorists if “there is
at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” that the motorist has violated the law).
99. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 24–25 (1968) (highlighting the need to
grant officers a means of determining whether a person poses a threat of physical
harm and a way to neutralize that risk).
100. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“This Court has
to date not deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not
constitute a search.”).
101. 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
102. Id., in 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765).
103. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886) (explaining that,
during the Revolutionary Period, American statesman were familiar with Entick, the
“monument of English freedom,” and its propositions were unquestionably in the
minds of the Framers as they created the Fourth Amendment).
104. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986) (holding that
police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they observe what is visible to
the public).
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As Justice Scalia noted in Jones, “This Court has to date not deviated
from the understanding that mere visual observation does not
constitute a search.”105
When police search inside of a home or another private
environment, of course, they engage in more than mere observation.
They first enter the space, thereby transforming their subsequent
observations into a search requiring a warrant (or some other
showing of constitutional reasonableness).106 By contrast, in public
spaces, police can often observe an individual’s movements and other
activities without having to set foot on anyone else’s property.107 To
the extent they invade the privacy of the person they watch, they
often do so simply through observing.
A second advantage of denying Fourth Amendment protections to
observations of what is visible in public is its simplicity and clarity. It
draws a clear line for police officers and citizens. What is inside a
home or office is protected; what is outside in public space is not. To
be sure, this kind of simple division does not line up perfectly with
individuals’ expectations of privacy. Individuals may well be more
eager to hide certain activities they conduct in public life, such as
travelling to a psychotherapist’s office or visiting an X-rated movie
theater, than they are to hide many mundane activities in their home
life, such as their choice of what to have for breakfast. But perhaps it
is not plausible to calibrate Fourth Amendment protections to the
privacy that individuals expect in each discrete activity.
The Supreme Court has certainly not tried to adjust the degree of
protection on an activity-by-activity basis in applying the Fourth
Amendment to in-home activity. On the contrary, as the Court
emphasized in Kyllo v. United States,108 “[i]n the home, . . . all details
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes.”109 It therefore does not matter that the activities
the government observes in gathering information from a home are
not particularly embarrassing or sensitive.
The Fourth Amendment errs on the side of protecting the privacy
of all in-home activity; perhaps it should err in the other direction
outside the home. If the public needs some protected space where it
can count on privacy without worrying about whether a particular
activity is or is not sufficiently intimate to be shielded, government
105. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
106. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
107. See id. at 949–50 (majority opinion).
108. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
109. Id. at 37 (holding that the use of thermal imagers to detect the heat
emissions coming from a house is a search under the Fourth Amendment).
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officials might also need some space where they can watch potentially
illegal activities without worrying, during each observation, whether
the activity they are watching is too private to look at (for too long)
without a warrant.110 Such a bright-line rule arguably would not only
provide certainty for police, but also reassure the population that
relies on them that law enforcement will be able to act proactively
and effectively to investigate and thwart criminal activity.
It is perhaps therefore not surprising that while the D.C. Circuit in
Maynard ventured to extend Fourth Amendment limits to public
surveillance,111 the other circuits to address the issue have found that
GPS tracking is a non-search by virtue of the fact that the information
it collects comes solely from a driver’s public and observable
activity.112 The Seventh Circuit, for example, noted in 2007 that while
GPS surveillance may threaten our privacy, it does not do so in a way
that makes it a Fourth Amendment search.113 Rather, it is a high-tech
analogue for visual tracking of a kind police have long done free
from constitutional restriction.114 “[I]f police follow a car around, or
observe its route by means of cameras mounted on lampposts or of
satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search,” and when
police “follow” the same car with GPS tracking technology, they are
“on the same side” of this constitutional “divide.”115 The Seventh
Circuit reaffirmed this position on GPS tracking after Maynard was
decided, noting again that so long as GPS tracking is limited to public
space, it reveals no more than what is already visible.116 The Eighth
110. Arguably, this clear division of inside “protected areas” and outside
unprotected ones is at odds with the Court’s oft-repeated language in Katz that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people not places,” and the key question is
therefore not about where a person is, but what that person reasonably expects will
remain private from the government. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 351–
52 (1967) (holding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office,” is unprotected, and “what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public,” is constitutionally shielded). But the
inconsistency may be only superficial. If we preserve privacy in public by enclosing
our property or action inside of a hidden space, and we expose our action in the
home by leaving it visible to people on the street, then Katz still tracks the
outside/inside distinction quite well. We lose our privacy inside the home when we
leave an in-home action visible to those in the outside world, and we can gain a
measure of privacy in public by finding a way to shroud it inside some kind of
enclosed container or other space.
111. Maynard v. United States, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S.
Ct. 1533 (2012) (mem.); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
113. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 997.
116. Id. at 997–98.
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and Ninth Circuits likewise applied Supreme Court precedent to
conclude that police no more engage in a Fourth Amendment search
when they track a car in public space using GPS technology than
when they track a car by following it.117 Video surveillance would, for
example, not only show that a particular car parked near a doctor’s
office, but also that a particular person emerged from the car, went
inside the office, and perhaps came out carrying a worried look on
her face. It would indicate not only that a person parked near a
particular bookstore or DVD store, but also, perhaps, what book or
movie she carried out of the store.118 These activities, of course, take
place in public where a person might be seen by others nearby,
including police officers. But in a world without ubiquitous public
surveillance, others are unlikely to focus on, let alone remember,
activities of strangers that have no significance to them. A video
archive, by contrast, gives interested officials a way to scrutinize (and
review) such acts after the fact, even if they have no probable cause or
other reasonable basis to track them.119 In short, if public and visible
space remains a Fourth Amendment-free zone, it provides room not
only for police to vigilantly watch the streets (as we expect them to
do), or perhaps notice and scrutinize activities that seem suspicious,
it also provides them with unlimited space to record, track, and
review the minute-by-minute activities of individuals they have no
reason to suspect of a crime. This includes activities that, although
occurring in public, deal with medical issues, reading preferences, or
other traditionally private information.120

117. See, e.g., Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10 (stating that no search occurs when the
use of GPS technology does not infringe upon a person’s privacy); Pineda-Moreno, 591
F.3d at 1216 (explaining that GPS technology serves as a substitute for physically
following a car on public roads and therefore similarly does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search).
118. See generally Adam Schwartz, Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive
and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 23
(2013) (“Without proper regulation, each of us must wonder whether the
government is watching and recording us when we walk into a book store, a political
meeting, or a psychiatrist’s office.”).
119. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1356 (describing how a video archive can allow the
government to virtually “randomly stop and closely scrutinize numerous people,”
exactly the type of searches the Fourth Amendment prevents).
120. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (listing examples of
public movements that could reveal private details (citing People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009))).
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C. The Supreme Court’s Signals About Fourth Amendment
Protection in Public Spaces
Perhaps because it was aware that there is sometimes a need for
privacy protection in public, the Supreme Court, even before its 2012
Jones decision, occasionally gave signals in dicta that it might carve out
some exceptions to its bright-line rule that what is public and
observable is not constitutionally protected from observation.121 It
pointed specifically to two kinds of potential exceptions: (1)
circumstances in which magnification of what is visible from public
airspace may reveal, not merely the contents of a field or greenhouse
or the design and operation of a factory, but internal “intimate
activity”;122 and (2) circumstances in which public surveillance is not
simply targeted at a particular person for a discrete time period, but
rather constitutes “dragnet” or “round-the-clock” tracking of a
person’s activities.123
Consider first some of the worries that the Court has raised about
magnification. In all three of the aerial surveillance cases that the
Court has heard, it held that aerial surveillance of a home’s curtilage,
or the property outside a factory, from a plane or helicopter did not
count as a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection.124
Instead, the Supreme Court stated that it might have been a protected
search had high-powered magnification technology allowed
government officials to observe not simply the property below, but
intimate activity or perhaps personal property located on it that
revealed elements of a person’s past or personality.125 In Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,126 the Court held that Environmental
Protection Agency officials did not trigger Fourth Amendment limits
when they photographed details of a factory they suspected of
pollution with a powerful map-making camera.127 But, as the Court
emphasized in a footnote, this was not a case where the government’s
121. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (noting
that using satellite surveillance technology might require a warrant in order to be
constitutional).
122. See infra notes 124–134 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s
discussions of potential constitutional issues with magnification).
123. See infra notes 135–138 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s cases
related to tracking devices).
124. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (plurality opinion) (curtilage of
a home); Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239 (industrial complex); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (curtilage of a home).
125. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238 (explaining that the magnification at issue
in the case was not strong enough to expose “intimate details,” which would raise
constitutional concerns).
126. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
127. Id. at 239.
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magnification revealed small items such as a “class ring” or
“identifiable human faces or secret documents captured in such a
fashion as to implicate more serious privacy concerns.”128 Similarly,
in Ciraolo, which was decided on the same day as Dow Chemical Co., the
Court hinted at the same “intimate details” protection against public
surveillance.129 It held that police did not violate reasonable
expectations of privacy when they used a fly-over airplane to observe
marijuana in the defendant’s backyard.130 But it also stressed that the
State itself had acknowledged that some fly-over observation might
well be a search when it employs “modern technology” to reveal
“those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise
imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.”131 And it included the
same hint in Florida v. Riley,132 even as it refused to find the police
engaged in a Fourth Amendment search when they hovered over the
defendant’s greenhouse in a helicopter and peered through a crack
in its roof to verify that it contained marijuana plants.133 The Court
made clear that there was no evidence that the state’s aerial
observation revealed any “intimate details connected with the use of
the home or curtilage.”134
In short, where the state uses
magnification to reveal intimate details in a home’s curtilage, it may
well be engaged in a search—even if those details are visible from
public airspace. The same might be true of magnification that is
aimed, not at a home’s curtilage, as in Ciraolo and Riley, or a
business’s property, as in Dow Chemical Co., but at activities in streets,
parks or open fields.
The Supreme Court also suggested, even before the concurrences
in Jones, that ongoing location tracking may reveal hidden details and
thus become a search. In its 1983 Knotts decision, the Court held that
police do not engage in a search when they use a radio transmitter to
track a driver’s movements on public roadways, while acknowledging
that more invasive location tracking might be a protected search.135
The Court noted the concern that finding the police conduct at issue

128. Id. at 238 n.5.
129. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 & n.3 (noting that the use of technology to aid the
naked eye might change Fourth Amendment analysis).
130. Id. at 215.
131. Id. at 215 n.3.
132. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
133. See id. at 450–51 (plurality opinion) (explaining why an expectation of
privacy from the air was unreasonable).
134. Id. at 452.
135. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (discussing the Eighth
Circuit’s finding that “intrusive” surveillance could be prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment but noting the limited invasiveness of the search used in this case).
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in Knotts to be within constitutional limits would mean that police
would likewise be free of all constitutional restraint if they conducted
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen” on a whim.136 Such a
“dragnet-type law enforcement practice[],” suggested the Supreme
Court, might be subject to Fourth Amendment limits, even if limited
location tracking with a radio transmitter is not.137 In Maynard, the
D.C. Circuit seized upon this reasoning and held that a twenty-eight
day period of continuous GPS surveillance was precisely the kind of
ongoing surveillance that the Court in Knotts explained would be
constitutionally problematic.138
Taken by themselves, these dicta do not provide ready-to-apply
Fourth Amendment rules for identifying searches in public spaces.
First, they do not provide the kind of identifiable boundary line
between searches and non-searches that law enforcement officers
need in order to know whether a particular search technique
requires a warrant. As noted earlier, there is no guiding principle for
when location tracking or video surveillance has occurred for too
long of a period—or collected too much information—to remain
free of constitutional limits.139 The same problem arises for a rule
that constitutionally shields “intimate” activities from magnification
technologies but leaves other types of activities, such as movements
on a road, free-for-the-taking. While certain activities, such as those
involving family interactions, romantic relationships, or medical
appointments, may intuitively be inappropriate for a state official to
spy upon, the fact is that people are different. What may be personal
and private for one person may not be for another. People are
idiosyncratic, and what is truly private is a matter of social context.140
For example, if a person is seeking a new job, he may want to buy
books on switching careers or visit a resume workshop without his
employer discovering these actions. These kinds of activities may not
be all that private for other people, such as a college student who,
like many others about to graduate, has to prepare herself for the job
market. But, those actions may be private for a long-time employee
who wants to, and perhaps must, hide his plans for a career-change
from a current boss. Courts are ill-equipped to make these
distinctions. Unlike a line that divides all content-based information
136. See id. at 283–84 (deferring constitutional analysis of such practices).
137. Id. at 284.
138. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–57 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.
140. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1412 (giving examples of situational and individual
factors that can influence the level of privacy desired).
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in an e-mail from non-content based information, such as an e-mail
address, a line that divides some kinds of “intimate” content from
other kinds of content is a hard line for courts to mark.
Still, the Supreme Court’s dicta about magnification and location
provides a foundation to build upon. The suggestion in its aerial
surveillance cases—that some types of magnification would count as a
search—captures a widely shared intuition; namely, that even in
public space, we may desire, and should still be able, to keep certain
details of our lives from being seen by others with whom we share
that space. Even in the outside world, certain details of our activity
may be so difficult for others to notice that they are akin to details we
have enclosed in a bag or a car. These activities are essentially
invisible because of their small size, the distance, or the limits of
natural human vision and human attention. These factors can hide
them almost as effectively as the invisibility created by a wall or
enclosure that blocks light. Details that cannot typically be seen
without magnification, because of size, distance, or visual limitations,
might constitute one category of outside information that should be
treated as “inside” for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The same is arguably true of information about us that can be
obtained only by aggregating numerous public observations of our
activity taken from a wide swathe of public space. This is the
argument at the heart of the mosaic theory that the D.C. Circuit used
in Maynard to find that GPS surveillance was a search.141 The D.C.
Circuit held:
[T]he information the police discovered in this case—the totality
of Jones’s movements over the course of a month—was not
exposed to the public: . . . unlike one’s movements during a single
journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month
is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone
will observe all those movements is effectively nil.142

Just as magnification reveals information that is effectively invisible
to observers in public space, so too did GPS surveillance in this case.
This information therefore also might be deemed to be akin to
“inside” information, which is generally not available to individuals
who make only surface-level observations of the activity around them
and do not deepen their observations with the aid of sophisticated
technology or a large coordinated team of observers.

141. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (discussing the government’s use of the mosaic
theory to justify collecting information for national security purposes).
142. Id. at 558.

BLITZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

48

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/2/2013 12:26 PM

[Vol. 63:21

Yet, while the Supreme Court has been right to express concerns
about certain kinds of magnification and about location tracking and
right not to make every instance of magnification and location
tracking a Fourth Amendment concern, it may have created future
challenges by suggesting that the way to distinguish worrisome from
unproblematic uses of these technologies requires courts to look at
the amount or type of information gleaned. As discussed in the next
Part, courts can better build upon the Supreme Court’s concerns
by focusing on the type or design of technology that the
government uses to magnify details or record a person’s path
through public space.
II. ANOTHER SOLUTION: RECORDING AND MAGNIFICATION SEARCHES
A. Constitutionalizing Public Surveillance: The Proposed Test
This Part proposes another way to mark the line between searches
and non-searches in public space. The core element of this proposal
is to treat all police recording of public movements and activities that
occur outside the presence of the officer doing the recording as a
Fourth Amendment search. In short, the government engages in a
search not merely when it watches a person, but when it systematically
collects information about her by recording what she does. In the
absence of a recording, magnification of the items a person is
carrying should likewise count as a “search” if the magnification
reveals details about “persons, houses, papers, persons, [or] effects”
that would only be discovered in a more traditional search. This
would require courts to be able to clearly identify situations where
magnification has the same effect as traditional searches, such as a
home entry, a pat down, or the unauthorized interception and review
of mailed or e-mailed documents.
This proposed test addresses the line-drawing problem because,
under this approach, it does not matter how long police investigate a
person’s public activities, but rather what technology they use to
investigate the individual. If the police use technology that can
capture images or record video or locations of individuals outside the
presence of the police officer doing the recording, then the
investigation counts as a search from the moment the officer hits the
“record” button. Even if the recording lasts only a minute, it is a
search. After all, a wiretap or use of an electronic “bug” would count
as a search from the moment it begins giving police access to the
conversation on which they are eavesdropping. The same would be
true of recording-free tracking and magnification-aided investigations
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described above. Once courts assure themselves that police are using
this advanced technology, any resulting investigation would be
classified as a “search,” regardless of its duration or detail.
Nor would such searches involve “mere visual surveillance.” While
the “eye cannot . . . be guilty of” Fourth Amendment violations,143
electronic monitoring of otherwise inaccessible data can be
unconstitutional. Such electronic monitoring, for example, often
counts as a “search” when it is used to intercept conversations.144 It
should likewise count as a search when it is used to record
individuals’ movements and activities in public space.
Another reason to focus on the recording of remote activities as a
trigger for Fourth Amendment protection is based on the fact that
courts and scholars alike often identify the central purpose of the
Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy. For example, Professor
Sherry Colb, a Fourth Amendment expert, made this claim in
responding to the notion that the Fourth Amendment only protects
privacy in a limited way—by protecting the privacy we receive from
control we exercise over our homes, cars, or other property.145 The
Framers’ goal in the Fourth Amendment, she wrote, can be best
understood as protecting “privacy in all of its incarnations.”146 Such
an emphasis on privacy is understandable given the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment since 1967. Under the
definition of “search” the Court has used since Katz, Fourth
Amendment protections are triggered only when government invades
“a reasonable expectation of privacy.”147 As a result, judges and
commentators often have understandably assumed that it is precisely
such an expectation of privacy, whether tightly linked to property or
143. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)).
144. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[B]road
and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which
electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment
safeguards.” (footnote omitted)).
145. See generally Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not
Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV.
889, 895–96 (2004) (discussing the privacy issues related to a hypothetical
mindreading device).
146. Id.
147. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have
applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said that a
violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33
(describing multiple Supreme Court cases applying the test from “Justice
Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence,” under which “a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable”).
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not, that the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect.148 Thus,
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones focused on understanding
whether the GPS tracking in that case intrudes upon a
“constitutionally protected sphere of privacy.”149 Even critics of the
Katz test, such as Professor Anthony Amsterdam, have spoken in
similar terms about Fourth Amendment purposes, arguing that its
core function is to prevent government attacks on privacy and
freedom that would be “inconsistent with the aims of a free and
open society.”150
But as the Katz majority itself observed, “privacy” is too general a
description of what the Fourth Amendment protects.151 “The Fourth
Amendment,” it observed, “cannot be translated into a general
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”152 Rather, it protects privacy against
“certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”153 The challenge facing
courts then is to pinpoint which types of governmental invasions into
privacy implicate Fourth Amendment purposes and which do not.
This is an important question for courts to ask as they analyze public
surveillance. After all, every time a police officer stares at a person
who is standing on the street or driving on the road, that officer is, in
some small measure, lessening that person’s privacy vis-à-vis the state.
He is watching activity that might otherwise go unnoticed by any
representative of the state. The same is true if an officer at a police
center watches a monitor displaying images from a remote street
camera. These are invasions of privacy, but that alone does not make
them violations of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, courts must also
assess whether the state’s reduction in our privacy in these cases is
accomplished by the “kinds of governmental intrusion” that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits.154
Unfortunately, the test that courts rely on most heavily to address
this challenge—the reasonable expectations of privacy test—sounds
precisely like a test for implementing the general right of privacy that
148. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–65 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(exploring whether the use of a GPS device violated the defendant’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy”), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
149. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
150. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 403 (1974).
151. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (explaining that while the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy, “its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy”).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 350 & n.4. (emphasis added) (discussing seizures of person and
property as also being protected by the Fourth Amendment whether they occur in
public or in private).
154. See id. at 350.
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the Katz majority had sought to distinguish from the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches. Rather than limit
Fourth Amendment safeguards to certain government intrusions into
privacy, that test subjects all such intrusions that interfere with the
privacy that individuals reasonably rely upon to constitutional limits.
Judges have sometimes emphasized that the requirement for
reasonable reliance is itself a limit.155 Even if a person expects privacy
on a public street (satisfying the first prong of the reasonable
expectations test), such an expectation is not one society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable (failing the second prong).156 But this
limit is not all that helpful. First, the privacy we reasonably rely upon
can be easily diminished, as Professor Amsterdam has highlighted,
and the Supreme Court soon after acknowledged, by government
action itself.157 By putting people on notice that they will be subject
to GPS monitoring, for example, the government could make it
unreasonable to expect freedom from such monitoring. Moreover,
the test also seems to place Fourth Amendment law on quickly
shifting sands. An expectation of privacy can change quite rapidly as
technology advances, and social norms change from year to year.158
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court has often interpreted
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in a way that seems at odds with
common intuitions about when citizens can expect privacy and, as
Professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher have
shown, with empirical data about such expectations.159
Still, there is reason to take seriously—and try to better elaborate
upon—the Supreme Court’s statement in Katz that the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches is narrower
than a general “right of privacy.” As the legal scholar William Stuntz
155. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(focusing on the fact that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
from ground-level observation, but not from aerial observation).
156. Cf. id. at 452, 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the plurality
erred by focusing on the helicopter being in legal airspace, when the real test was
whether the helicopter was in airspace used “with sufficient regularity” that its
presence would be reasonable to society).
157. See Amsterdam, supra note 150, at 384.
158. See Richard Sobel et al., The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones:
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 23–24 (2013) (noting the difficulty for an expectation-based test
raised by the fact that “[e]xpectations of privacy may differ from person to person
and from day to day”).
159. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737–42, 774 (1993) (reporting
findings about expectations of privacy indicating that “the Supreme Court’s
conclusions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment are often not in tune with
commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques”).
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powerfully argued, it would be odd to see the Fourth Amendment as
providing such a right against government collection of our
information through surveillance, when the modern regulatory state
permits (indeed, even requires) collection of much of the same
information in so many other ways.160 Stuntz noted that “much of
what the modern state does outside of ordinary criminal investigation
intrudes on privacy just as much as the kinds of police conduct that
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law forbid.”161
While the focus of this Article is not on the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, it is useful to at least propose one alternative way of
identifying the subset of privacy violations that also constitute
possible Fourth Amendment violations. The best way to identify such
governmental intrusion is to begin with the paradigmatic type of
invasion that the Fourth Amendment protects us from: the police
“fishing expedition.” This is a kind of investigation that sifts through
our property with the aim of finding some contraband, evidence of
crime, or other findings that would justify subjecting us to state
coercion. We find this type of invasion, for example, in the home
search where officials rummage through drawers and papers looking
for evidence of crime. We find it also in certain airport or road-block
search practices, found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and
other appellate courts,162 where police stop every traveler or car to see
if they happen to find evidence of drug possession. As Judge Kozinski
stated in a decision holding such a practice unconstitutional when
used at an airport security gate, an airport checkpoint is a tempting
place for officers to look for evidence of all contraband, even
contraband unrelated to air travel.163 Such a checkpoint is “a sieve
through which pass the contents of billions of satchels, purses,
briefcases and pockets [which] will naturally strain out much that is
of interest to law enforcement.”164 But, while tempting, use of such a
checkpoint in this way is unconstitutional.165 It imposes upon
individuals the kind of dragnet search that the Fourth Amendment is
160. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1995).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 48 (2000) (stating
that the Supreme Court has never found constitutional a roadblock whose primary
purpose was finding evidence of criminal activity).
163. See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1247–48 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that a generalized search of passengers’ baggage violated Fourth
Amendment principles).
164. Id. at 1246.
165. See id. at 1247–48 (finding that the search was not constitutional under the
concepts of an administrative search, a Terry stop, consent, exigent circumstances,
inventory searches, or border searches).
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designed to bar, allowing law enforcement to treat individuals they
have no reason to suspect of a crime as potential criminals who, as
such, must reveal all of their possessions and papers, as well as their
persons, for thorough examination. Airport checkpoints can and
are, of course, permissibly used to conduct certain kinds of
suspicionless searches—namely, searches of every air traveler for
weapons or items that might be used for terrorism.166 However, such
searches are subject to tight constitutional limits.167
The constitutionality of types of observations by officials can be
defined by this kind of paradigmatic analysis. After all, it is not the
case that every state intrusion into an individual’s privacy, even
privacy that we reasonably rely upon, necessarily subjects us to the
functional equivalent of the general search or dragnet investigation
that was the focus of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Rather,
what constitutes a general search is not only that it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy, but that it does so in a way that alters an
individual’s relationship with the state. It converts that individual
into a suspected criminal.
This is a concern that is, to some extent, at the core of the key
alternatives to a privacy-based account of Fourth Amendment
purpose. The Fourth Amendment’s purpose is not simply to preserve
a certain amount of privacy; it is rather to assure that individual
citizens are ordinarily able to keep a certain amount of distance
between themselves and the coercive machinery of state power—and
live with a certain level of freedom from that power—and freedom
from fear of being subjected to it on an official’s whim. Professor
William Stuntz, for example, argued that the central evil that Fourth
Amendment law was designed to combat was not police observation,
but police coercion.168 “[P]rivacy protection,” Stuntz wrote, “has little
to do with the worst aspects of police misconduct,” which are about
violence towards, or intimidation of, suspects.169 Using a vehicle
search as an illustration, Stuntz argued that when police stop a driver
and ask for consent to search the car for drugs, the most worrisome
consequence of such a stop for an innocent person subject to the

166. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing
the purpose behind airport searches).
167. See $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1247–48 (explaining that airport
security searches cannot be used to search for contraband generally or things that
“merely look suspicious”).
168. See Stuntz, supra note 160, at 1020 (arguing that criminal procedure law’s
focus on information gathering over police coercion comes at the expense of
protecting values).
169. Id. at 1078.
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search is not that the police will see or examine whatever happens to
be in the car; it is “the indignity of being publicly singled out as a
criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted by
uniformed, armed police officers.”170 In a similar vein, Professor Jed
Rubenfeld has reasoned, based in large part on the Fourth
Amendment’s text, that the Amendment’s central purpose was not to
assure privacy but security—to protect people from “stifling
apprehension and oppression that people would justifiably
experience if forced to live their personal lives in fear of appearing
‘suspicious’ in the eyes of the state.”171 Another scholar, Scott
Sundby, likewise offered an alternative to the conventional privacybased account.
He stated that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment “is founded upon the idea that integral to the
Constitution and our societal view of government is a reciprocal trust
between the government and its citizens.”172 Police, he argued,
should not be permitted in our constitutional system to act in ways
that treat each citizen as a potential criminal.173 For example, police
should not be permitted to search for contraband in the trash cans of
individuals they have no reason to suspect of criminal wrongdoing.174
While the exact implications of these non-privacy-based approaches
to the Fourth Amendment depend on how they are elaborated, it
seems likely that each would justify putting some limits on when and
how closely police can track or scrutinize individuals’ activities in a
public space. A society where the state tracks a person’s every move,
even when it has no good reason to believe he is a criminal, is
arguably not showing the kind of trust in its citizenry that Sundby
insisted the Fourth Amendment demands.175 Nor is it likely to leave
people feeling secure that, if they obey the law, the government will
leave them free from its coercive grasp. A person who feels that the
government is always watching for any hint of a legal misstep is likely
to feel that a police interrogation and arrest is always a possibility. So
Stuntz might find that unconstrained drone tracking carries some of
the same harms as arbitrary car searches. And Rubenfeld might find
that such ever present drone monitoring generates in its target an
170. Id. at 1064.
171. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 127 (2008).
172. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994).
173. See generally id. at 1811–12 (summarizing the argument for an approach to
Fourth Amendment analysis based on the concept of government-citizen trust).
174. See id. at 1788–93 (discussing the lengths the Supreme Court went to in order
to justify finding that searches of garbage were outside the Fourth Amendment).
175. See id. at 1811–12 (explaining that the trust-based approach better aligns with
democratic principles).
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intense “fear of appearing ‘suspicious’ in the eyes of the state”—the
precise fear the Fourth Amendment’s protections are designed to
spare us.176
Although these accounts often offer an emphasis on trust, security,
or freedom from police abuse as an alternative to a privacy-based
account of Fourth Amendment purposes, they are perhaps better
understood as refinements of such a privacy-based account. State
surveillance that threatens Fourth Amendment values, does so in
large part because it wrestles privacy away from citizens, leaving the
private details of their lives exposed to review and examination by an
outside observer. Such a privacy violation is a necessary condition for
a state measure to implicate Fourth Amendment interests, at least
when the state avoids the kind of trespassory or other interference
with property that itself counts as a Fourth Amendment search, but it
is not a sufficient condition. Rather, a privacy intrusion generally
violates the Fourth Amendment only when it treats an innocent
individual as a suspected criminal and thereby makes her more
vulnerable to the state’s power of coercion and punishment.
A police investigation that generates and stores records of our
public movements and activities creates the effect of treating society
as suspected criminals. It not only reduces the privacy of those it
records.
It also, as Justice Sotomayor explained, allows the
government “more or less at will” to review innumerable details of an
individual’s life for evidence of possible wrongdoing.177 As a result,
people may be subjected to “arbitrary exercises of police power.”178
B. Recording as a Dividing Line Between Searches and Non-Searches
Recording should thus be central to Fourth Amendment law
because, in the context of public surveillance, it allows authorities to
sift through sensitive information about our movements and
activities. A recording transforms an ephemeral event into a
permanent record. It thus frees authorities from the burden (and
cost) of having to observe the public’s movements and activities as
they occur. It also removes the challenge of having to remember
those movements well enough to compare or combine them with
other observations in order to build a larger picture. For example,

176. Rubenfeld, supra note 171, at 127.
177. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (discussing the importance of considering a GPS device’s ability to allow
recording and aggregation of the details of a person’s movements in determining if
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy).
178. Id.
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the kind of “precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements” cannot be easily created unless a GPS unit not only
transmits information to police about a person’s whereabouts, but
also captures that information in electronic memory.179 In fact,
Sotomayor explained in her concurrence that the fact that the GPS
device allows recording and aggregation is precisely what allows the
government to discover the private details of public activities.180
Recording is also usually indispensable to creating the kind of
detailed “mosaic” of a person’s life, which the D.C. Circuit found so
concerning and identified as a basis for subjecting GPS surveillance
to Fourth Amendment limits. As the D.C. Circuit emphasized, with a
record of a person’s movements over a several day long period, police
can learn things about a person’s life that would be unknown to all
other passersby who happen to see that person on roads or streets:
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not
told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places
over the course of a month. The sequence of a person’s
movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s
office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks
later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person
who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a
weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an
unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just
one such fact about a person, but all such facts.181

The D.C. Circuit did not emphasize the difference between
recording and merely observing activities in its opinion. But the
difference is important for its argument: it is far more laborious for
police to aggregate these details of a person’s activities unless it
records each movement or action for later comparison with others.
If, in the above example, a particular official does not have a record
of the first visit to a gynecologist’s office, it is far less likely he will be
able to combine it with the subsequent visit to the baby supply store
to infer that the woman is expecting a child. And it is unlikely that
he will have access to the earlier detail, unless he is doing all of the
tracking himself or working with a team of officers that are constantly
sharing information that they have recorded. It is conceivable that
even without any recording device, officials could draw an inference
179. Id. at 955.
180. See id. at 956 (arguing that this factor is important in determining society’s
expectation of privacy).
181. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (footnote
omitted), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
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from the woman’s two visits.
However, this becomes more
implausible when an investigation aggregates not only two, but tens
or hundreds of events.
The latter type of investigation, as Justice Alito stated in his Jones
concurrence, could hardly have happened in a world before GPS
surveillance without “a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and
perhaps aerial assistance.”182 Even in a pre-GPS form of extended
location tracking, officials would need to create records of their
target’s movements in order to share their observations with others
on the team.183 At least one recent state court decision has treated
the fact that one can imagine a more primitive analogue of
automated recording as evidence that it cannot be a search. In Foltz
v. Commonwealth,184 the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that because
“a police officer could have followed and personally recorded the
movements of the van” without conducting a search, the use of a GPS
recording device to track the van was not a search.185 But this is not
the inevitable conclusion one might draw from such an analogy. It
would be extraordinarily difficult for a single officer to follow a van as
continuously as a GPS device: it would be an unusual officer, able to
forego a significant amount of sleep, who could follow a van driver’s
every (unpredictable) movement over the course of an entire week.
A team of policemen, as Justice Alito recognized, would likely be
required, and the fact that one can imagine a much more expensive
and complicated low-technology analogue for GPS recording does
not mean that GPS recording is not a search.186
Recording is even more of a game-changing technology for video
surveillance than it is in location tracking. When police not only use
video cameras on street lamps or drones for real time monitoring,
but also to create video surveillance footage that may be subject to
later review, they allow for a kind of investigation that is far more
intrusive—and far more like a dragnet search—than real-time
monitoring. Not only can police aggregate and compare different
events or actions, as they can in the context of location tracking, but
they can also pause on a particular frame, examine it closely, and

182. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. See infra Part II.C (describing the type of traditional police work necessary to
record as much information as a GPS device).
184. 698 S.E.2d 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 732 S.E.2d 4 (Va. 2012).
185. See id. at 291–93 (reasoning that the use of GPS technology did not provide a
substitute for police behavior that would have otherwise violated a right to privacy
because the police could have followed and personally recorded the movements of
the van).
186. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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notice small details of a person’s appearance or action that they
would be very unlikely to notice if they had only one chance to
perceive and remember an event as it occurred.
At the extreme, a recording could create the kind of science fiction
world Lewis Padgett depicted in the story, “Private Eye.”187 This is a
world in which every action we take is recorded and stored in policeowned video footage and in which officials can therefore watch the
day-to-day existence of any individual the way most people watch a
DVD or downloaded movie—by watching it unfold on a screen and
pausing to rewind and review sequences that they did not fully
perceive or understand the first time through.188 If officials subjected
an individual who they have no reason to suspect of a crime to this
kind of video review just to see if the video record happened to reveal
anything suspicious, there is little question that they would be poring
over personal details of that person’s life in much the same way they
do in a more traditional “dragnet” search.
Moreover, what is significant about video recording for Fourth
Amendment purposes is not only the way it allows authorities to
aggregate and compare many small details of our day-to-day lives, but
also the power it gives them to pause on or review the same detail
over and over again. We normally miss a good deal of what is
happening in a scene in front of our eyes. Typically, people do not
consciously perceive elements of a scene that they have no need to
notice.189 Video recording, by contrast, captures the information our
perception misses. It replaces our flawed natural memory with an
artificial replacement that lacks its imperfections and allows police to
overcome its limits.190 In large part, for this reason, Justice Harlan
wrote that even a form of surveillance that is not normally a search,
187. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1350–59 (citing Lewis Padgett, Private Eye, in THE
MIRROR OF INFINITY: A CRITICS’ ANTHOLOGY OF SCIENCE FICTION 99 (Robert Silverberg
ed., 1970)) (proffering that science fiction has given us a view of the potential future
of government surveillance and the need to reconsider the approach to the Fourth
Amendment).
188. See Padgett, supra note 187, at 100 (describing a fictional “omniscience,”
which stored a fifty-year history of light and sound images and was “a device for
looking into the past”).
189. See CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: HOW OUR
INTUITIONS DECEIVE US 5–7 (2009) (recounting an experiment in which individuals
tasked with counting ball passes in a game depicted in a video failed to notice an
appearance by an actor in a gorilla suit in the middle of the game); Daniel L.
Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience,
54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 182, 186 (1999) (explaining experiments in which people fail
to perceive significant elements in their environment such as the substitution of a
different person for a stranger asking them directions).
190. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1356 (describing how video recordings can be as
intrusive as stop-and-frisks).
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such as government use of an informant to gather information about
a suspected drug dealer or other criminal, should become a search
when the informant does not simply listen and remember what he is
told, but also electronically transmits and records it.191 There is a
constitutionally significant difference, he stated, between “third-party
monitoring and recording which insures full and accurate disclosure
of all that is said, free of the possibility of error and oversight that
inheres in human reporting.”192 In a world in which individuals
gossip about or share what they have observed, our privacy is
threatened, but in a way that is often tolerable:
Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count on
the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited
audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either overlook
or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s inability to
reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a
documented record.193

In a world of unrestrained recording, by contrast, there is no
comfort in knowing that small and obscure aspects of our
conversation will escape notice because recordings can be played
over and over again to multiple listeners. We do not have the power
to “reformulate a conversation” by offering our own account. The
audio recording will provide an authoritative, and virtually
indisputable, account. It is thus inevitable, said Justice Harlan, that in
a world of unrestrained recording “words would be measured a good
deal more carefully and communication inhibited.”194
In discussing audio recording, Justice Harlan focused primarily on
its threat to privacy and its possible chilling effect on
communication.195 For Fourth Amendment purposes, however, what
is most worrisome about unconstrained video surveillance (or
location tracking for that matter) is not simply that it substantially
diminishes our privacy and leads us to refrain from taking
spontaneous actions we worry may become part of a permanent
record. Instead, it is how this specific kind of diminution of privacy
affects each individual’s relationship with state power.
While
recording by anybody else (including other private individuals)

191. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787–90 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that transmitting or transcribing conversations is potentially
more damaging to free society than the risk of an informant later reporting on a
conversation).
192. Id. at 787.
193. Id. at 787–88.
194. Id. at 787.
195. Id. at 787–89.

BLITZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

60

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/2/2013 12:26 PM

[Vol. 63:21

reduces our privacy to some degree, systematic recording by the
government diminishes it even more. It allows the government to
systematically analyze aspects of our lives, which, in a liberal,
individual rights-based society, are not the government’s business.
Furthermore, it permits the government to do so with the aim of
finding, by chance, some basis for subjecting a person to the far
greater degree of police power that has traditionally been reserved
for those individuals who officials have reason to think are engaged
in criminal activity.
Given these observations about the effects of recording, one might
wonder why the test proposed in this Article does not make all
government recording a search and instead requires that, to
constitute a search, an officer’s recording must be “remote,” meaning
outside the realm that the recording officer can perceive with his
eyes, ears, and other senses. After all, Justice Harlan’s grave worries
about recording seem to apply not just to a drone’s recording of
events occurring far from the drone’s operator, but also to recordings
that a police officer makes of what is happening in front of him.196
Even in a public space, the presence of a government-recording
device may chill a citizen’s speech or other expressive activity—even if
a single police officer operates the device and it is not a part of a
massive, surreptitious, surveillance system.
However, for Fourth Amendment purposes, there is an important
difference between a police officer recording his own interactions,
and that which the government gathers from pedestrians and drivers
throughout public space. As suggested above, the point of the
Fourth Amendment is not simply to protect privacy, but to prevent
the state from engaging in the kind of privacy violation that occurs in
a dragnet investigation or other “general search” where the state
reaches out and subjects individual actions to extensive or
penetrating analysis.197 By contrast, where recording is not remote—
where a camera mounted on a police car simply captures footage of a
police officer’s interactions at a traffic stop, or a police officer uses an
iPhone (or a camera in his uniform) to capture events that occur on
a street around him—then the recording is far less amenable to being
used to create a searchable archive of an individual’s detailed
movements and activities. By contrast, “uniform cams,” tiny cameras
196. See generally id. at 787 (failing to differentiate between transmitting and
transcribing of conversations).
197. See supra notes 156–72 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy is much narrower that the common understanding of
the right to privacy and that the Fourth Amendment only seeks to protect
unreasonable invasions of privacy, such as police fishing expeditions with no limits).
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built into an officer’s uniform to record each encounter a police
officer has with a citizen, are designed and used to archive the police
officer’s own encounters with citizens.198 They are not designed to
gather data about innumerable citizen activities happening far from
the officer that are unrelated to what the officer is doing.199 They are
intended, as one former police chief puts it, to “collect[] and
preserv[e] the best evidence about every encounter between the
police officer and the community.”200
The larger concern about uniform or dashboard cams is not the
privacy threat they raise in each encounter they record, but rather
what police might do by technologically enhancing or aggregating
such image-capture. If police combine—into a central, searchable
data collection—the images that each of them captures on a uniform
or dashboard-mounted camera, such action could begin to mimic the
effects of a larger recording system. However, a definition of “search”
broad enough include any action that could threaten privacy, in
combination with other surveillance measures, would cover far too
much ground: Virtually any kind of police observation could, in
combination with other measures, threaten our privacy and perhaps
even allow arbitrary fishing expeditions. A technological form-based
or design-based test of the kind proposed in this Article would be of
little import if it were this broad.
To be sure, one can imagine scenarios in which police uniform
cams or dashboard cams are designed not to serve their current
purpose of preserving records about each police officer’s encounter
with the community, but rather to sweep in, and preserve for later
review, evidence about citizens’ actions and movement. Imagine for
example, that instead of mounting a camera that records merely what
is in front of the car, police mount a camera like the rotating cameras
mounted on top of Google’s Street View vehicles,201 that constantly
captures footage from the 360-degree field surrounding the police
car each minute and magnifies each part of this visual field to reveal

198. See Janice Morse, Tiny Uniform Cams Next Big Thing in Policing, USA TODAY
(May 7, 2013, 6:36 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/07
/tiny-police-cameras/2140483 (noting that the uniform cameras cannot lie and are
intended to provide an accurate account of what occurs in the course of police
work).
199. See id. (discussing how cameras worn on uniforms are the next step beyond
dashboard cameras).
200. Id.
201. See Behind the Scenes: Street View, G OOGLE , http://www.google.com/maps
/about/behind-the-scenes/streetview (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (describing how the
Google Street View car is capable of taking 360-degree panoramic images to create
three-dimensional models of the photographed environment).
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details of every person and car passing by. Although such a police car
camera technically only captures data from the realm that the officer
can potentially see and hear, it might still collect a worrisome amount
of data about individual citizens. In fact, such a video surveillance
system threatens Fourth Amendment values in the same way as a citywide system of video recording carried out from stationary cameras or
aerial drones: The cameras simply happen to be mounted on police
cars rather than on lamp-posts or drones. In such a circumstance,
courts should find that police do engage in a search when they use
the combined, programmatic use of police car cameras to create, and
later review, ongoing records of citizens’ movements.
C. Extensions: When Magnification—and Recording—Should Count as
Searches and When They Should Not
This Article so far has argued that police conduct a Fourth
Amendment search when they remotely record a person’s actions or
movements, whether they do so with a drone-based camera, a
network of street cameras, or a GPS-tracking device. As noted earlier,
such recording enables government officials to search public lives frame-byframe, much in the way it might search documents file-by-file. But while
remote recording is the clearest type of search in a public space, it is
not necessarily the only type. Even in the absence of any recording,
police might take advantage of other surveillance technologies to
circumvent the traditional Fourth Amendment protection for our
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Using a high-powered
telescope, for example, officials gather information from the inside
of a person’s home that they might otherwise obtain only by entering
the house or the curtilage.
There is certainly precedent for the Supreme Court to classify a
form of surveillance as a “search” when it is the functional equivalent
of surveillance that would be a search. In Kyllo, the Court found that
police engaged in a search of a home when they pointed a thermal
imager at the home from the street outside to measure the heat
emissions in order to determine if there likely was a marijuanagrowing lamp within.202 This was not, of course, a traditional home
search: the officers never entered the house.203 They simply
measured the heat leaking through its walls from a public street
where they had every right to be without a warrant.204 The Supreme
202. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34 (2001).
203. See id. at 30 (noting the search was performed from the passenger seat of the
agent’s car).
204. See id.
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Court nonetheless held that these heat measurements from the
outside were a search, largely because their intrusion into the home
was functionally equivalent to a home entry.205
In fact, this concept of functional equivalence was built into the
test that the Supreme Court proposed for how to apply the Fourth
Amendment to the use of “sense enhancing” technologies to observe
the home. The Court held that the use of such technology counts as
a search when it is employed to obtain information that otherwise
could have been obtained only through “physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area.’”206 The Court added the caveat that
this applies only to technology that “is not in general public use.”207
So while police are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints when
collecting heat measurements from the home with a thermal imager,
they might be free of such limits if they instead look at the home’s
walls with the same kind of binoculars available to bird watchers,
sports fans, or amateur astronomers.208 Perhaps this is because unlike
thermal imagers, which people do not expect to have pointed at their
houses in the course of their normal day-to-day existence, binocularviewers are a common part of life in modern society, and individuals
who wish to safeguard their privacy cannot expect that their
activities will always escape magnification by others in their
neighborhood. Still, the Supreme Court made clear that it will not
allow police to circumvent the Fourth Amendment command that
searches of a home be reasonable. 209
Invading the home
technologically from outside its walls is as much a Fourth
Amendment search as invading it physically.
Public surveillance might sometimes cross a Fourth Amendment
line and trigger reasonableness requirements, not only when it
involves magnification of in-home activities, but also when it is the
functional equivalent of other categories of searches. For example, if
205. See id. at 33–34 (basing their finding on the fact that the sensors provided
information that otherwise only would have been obtainable by physical intrusion).
206. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419
(2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (finding that use of a drug detecting dog to alert to
drugs inside the house uses a sense-enhancing “device” to invade the house in a way
equivalent to a home entry).
207. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
208. It is not clear how the Supreme Court would rule on this. In Kyllo, the Court
noted that use of technological enhancement had not been completely resolved. Id.
at 33. In upholding the use of magnification in Dow Chemical Co., the Court noted
that an important factor was that the area photographed was not near a home. Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.3 (1986).
209. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (analyzing the search of a home using thermal images
for reasonableness)
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future police officers use a zoom camera to hone in on a person’s
pockets or wallet, or the book or letter he is holding in his hand, such
public surveillance can reveal to police what they could otherwise
learn only by physically rummaging through his pockets or wallet, or
asking him to hand over the book or letter for official review. If so,
then such magnification would arguably allow police with senseenhancing technology to do what they could otherwise do only with a
search of a person, his papers, or his effects. Under those
circumstances, perhaps, the Supreme Court should react as it did in
Kyllo. Just as the Court did not permit government officials there to
collect, from afar, information about the home’s interior life that it
could otherwise have taken only by physical entry, it might similarly
bar officials from collecting difficult-to-observe details about a person
or what he is carrying that they could otherwise obtain only by
stopping a person and searching his belongings.210
In fact, such a stance on magnification could help explain the
Supreme Court’s otherwise puzzling statements in the aerial
surveillance cases. As noted earlier, the Court in those cases
suggested that observation of a home’s curtilage from planes and
helicopters normally raised no Fourth Amendment concerns but
might well do so if they captured “intimate activities.”211 This activitybased criterion for aerial searches seems at odds with the way the
Court normally analyzes searches in or around a home. After all,
when courts ask if police need a warrant to enter a home, they do not
ask whether the home search is aimed at uncovering intimate details
or more impersonal information.212 Rather, they assume, as Justice
Scalia explained in Kyllo, that “[i]n the home, . . . all details are
intimate details”213 and, on that basis, require a warrant for any entry
210. One might object that such functional equivalence is a false one. Highpowered magnification, for example, might be the high-tech equivalent not of what a
police officer does when he seizes and reviews personal effects or documents (a
search), but rather of what he does when he takes a furtive glance at someone’s
reading materials or possessions from a nearby seat in a restaurant or park. Highpowered amplification likewise might be more akin to listening to the personal
argument between a nearby couple than it is to intercepting a phone call between
them. But where telescopic viewing or amplification gives an official a covert way to
observe what they would otherwise have to do by being present, this technological
shift in the challenge they face should make a constitutional difference.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 124–134; see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
59, 62 (2007) (mentioning factors that courts consider when determining whether
surveillance of a home’s curtilage is too invasive and observing that surveillance of a
home’s interior would entail different, heightened protections).
212. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”).
213. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.

BLITZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FUTURE

11/2/2013 12:26 PM

65

into the home. If, as the Supreme Court has sometimes phrased it, a
backyard or other curtilage surrounding the home receives Fourth
Amendment protection because it is an “extension of [the] home,”214
then why treat its protection as variable? Why understand the
curtilage’s Fourth Amendment shield to protect some of the activity
that police can observe from a public vantage point but not other
kinds of activities that occur in the same location and are just as open
to observation? One possible answer is that, if the Court protects
intimate details in the curtilage from scrutiny by high-powered drone
cameras, it is because they are the kinds of details that police could
not traditionally and typically learn without searching a person, her
house, her documents, or her effects. Such a rule might also make
sense because just as people cannot prevent certain evidence of inhome activities from leaking out—for example, in the form of heat
emissions—they also cannot completely and continuously conceal
their private documents and personal items from exposure to the
outside world. Individuals in the modern world will occasionally have
to read an e-mail or mark-up a memo as they ride on a subway or sit
in an airport. They will occasionally read a book as they rest in a park
or a plaza or check the readings on a personal fitness monitor as they
walk through a public space.
The fact that individuals have little choice but to bring these items
into public space, where powerful cameras may magnify them and
give officials a closer look, does not mean that they are fair game for
untrammeled official scrutiny. The Supreme Court noted in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.215 that even when students enter the closely supervised
and monitored environment of a school, they often have no choice
but to bring with them numerous personal items, including “keys,
money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming,” as
well as “photographs, letters, and diaries.”216 The Court emphasized
that these items remain protected from arbitrary searches, even in
the tightly controlled confines of a school.217 It is hard to see why

214. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013) (“[T]he curtilage of
the house . . . enjoys protection as part of the home itself.”); United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (outlining the historical origins of the idea of curtilage in
common law); see also id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “curtilage is
the area which extends the intimate activity associated with . . . a man’s home and
the privacies of life” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
215. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
216. Id. at 339.
217. See id. at 339–43 (striking a balance in schools between permitting entirely
arbitrary searches and requiring warrants for every search).
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students (or other individuals) would lose such protection in a
public space.
The same is true of cell phone conversations. Conversations that
once took place entirely over phone lines between home phones,
office phones, and pay phones now increasingly take place over cell
phones, often as one or both speakers are walking down the street,
waiting at an airport, or sitting in a coffee shop. It seems odd to
think that a modern-day Katz could be constitutionally subjected to
electronic eavesdropping by government officials armed with
parabolic microphones or other sound amplification devices because
the private conversation he had to conduct from a phone booth on
the street in 1967 would today take place over a cell phone call
from the same street. Thus, Professor Wayne LaFave’s proposal
that the Fourth Amendment be understood to protect against use
of hidden microphones or recording devices, even in public space,
seems justified.218
To be sure, Kyllo’s doctrine of functional equivalence should be
applied with caution: Every police method that uncovers details
about a suspect is, at a high level of generality, functionally similar to
other methods of uncovering the same details. Police unable to
obtain evidence of a drug conspiracy from a suspect’s home will have
to try to find evidence of the conspiracy elsewhere, such as in public
space or in third-party records. The match between evidence sought
outside the home, and that which is inside the home, does not—and
should not—automatically transform the public, or third-party
record, surveillance into a search.
One key advantage of the technological form-based or designbased test proposed in this Article is that it provides a clearer line
between searches and non-searches in a public space—and this line
would be easily blurred if the doctrine of functional equivalence were
applied too freely. Consider, for example, the difficulties that might
arise if courts not only accepted this Article’s proposal to count
remote recording as a search, but also classified as a search all
techniques they found to have effects equivalent to remote recording.
Consider, for example, the type of search that Justice Alito identified
218. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.2(e), at 442–43 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting that privacy expectations
are more reasonable for private conversations that take place in a public place than
for actions that take place in public space); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:
Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 36 (2004) (considering a
“presence of electronic surveillance” test under which “any conversation a police
officer could hear unaided would not be private, but those that required a wiretap or
a bug would be constitutionally protected”).
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as an earlier-era equivalent of GPS tracking: an operation that
follows a suspect’s movements with a team of officers, multiple
vehicles, and aerial observation.219 Even without a recording device,
such tracking may threaten to impose a temporary dragnet on an
individual. By following his movements and activities from place to
place, police may make an observation that gives them justification to
move in for a pat-down or an arrest. Or, consider a simpler version of
such tracking: one officer tails a person’s vehicle, observes what the
suspect does when he exits the vehicle and whether he goes into any
particular offices or homes. The officer then reports his observations
by cell phone to another officer at the station house, who writes down
any observations that either of the officers believes to be of interest.
Such observation and dictation might produce, with less advanced
technology, records equivalent to those captured with automated
video recording or location tracking.220 Or, in a situation more akin
to the GPS tracking in Jones, police could use a GPS-tracking device
that transmits to the police station, but does not record, the location
that a car is in at a particular moment.
In such circumstances, it is plausible that a court intent on
safeguarding Fourth Amendment interests would classify the
systematic tracking that takes place as a search, even in the absence of
an automated recording. Doing so may seem necessary to block
police from circumventing the limits that apply to recording.
However, it is not clear, why, if police become subject to Fourth
Amendment requirements when they follow a person with multiple
vehicles for a day, they do not likewise engage in a Fourth
Amendment search for twenty minutes. All such tracking potentially
raises some of the same dangers raised by ongoing recording of a
person’s movements. But that does not mean all of it should count as
a “search.” And the same problems that make the mosaic theory
problematic also confront a proposal to count police tracking as a
search only when it goes on long enough or involves a certain
number of vehicles or officers.
219. See United States v, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment) (describing what would have been needed to accomplish the
search before the advent of GPS-tracking technology).
220. Indeed, when Justice Harlan insisted that there is a constitutionally
significant difference between “third-party monitoring and recording,” United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the “recording” that so
disturbed him was this kind of primitive record creation. Instead of secretly audio
recording his conversation with the target of the investigation, the informant wore a
bug that transmitted the conversation to an officer outside who surreptitiously
listened and then testified after the informant disappeared. Id. at 746–47 (plurality
opinion).
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III. OBJECTIONS, ALTERNATIVES, AND LIMITS: DIFFERENT WAYS OF
DEFINING A “SEARCH” (AND A “REASONABLE SEARCH”) IN PUBLIC
There are two major objections one might offer against this
definition of what kinds of investigatory methods count as a “search”
in a public space. First, one might argue that it is too restrictive or
that it would leave police unable to effectively investigate and deter
crime. Second, one might argue that it is not restrictive enough; it
places too much police work outside of the Constitution’s search and
seizure limits, which presents a serious threat to privacy.
A. The Objection that the Test Leaves Police Needing Greater Freedom To
Investigate
This objection requires a brief examination of how Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standards apply to police investigative
methods. Focusing on what kind of police activity the Fourth
Amendment covers is only the first step in the two-step inquiry courts
must undertake to decide if police activity violates the Constitution.
The fact that the Constitution and its requirements cover a particular
investigatory method does not mean that the search violates the
Constitution. Rather, a search is constitutionally impermissible only
when it is “unreasonable.”221 So, even if GPS tracking or video
surveillance in public counts as a search, courts will allow such
surveillance when it is reasonable.222 Traditional searches, such as
home entries, are reasonable only if police first obtain a warrant
based on probable cause.223 This was also what the Supreme Court
assumed police would have to do if they wished to attach a GPS
device to a car to track the driver’s movements, as they did in Jones.224
However, obtaining a warrant will not always be practical. In fact, it is
implausible to require camera operators to obtain a warrant each
time they record citizens’ activities in public streets. Some existing
camera systems collect data continuously and such warrantless
operation of video surveillance is often necessary to its effectiveness.
Police cannot be expected to seek a warrant for video images the
value of which is apparent only after a crime has occurred, as was the

221. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“It goes without saying that the
Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
222. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 331–32.
223. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“[S]earches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”).
224. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49 (finding that a valid warrant is necessary for a
Fourth Amendment search to be reasonable).
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case in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing investigation and in the
earlier July 2005 investigation of the London subway bombings.225
One possible response is to argue that this kind of video
surveillance should not count as a search at all because, unlike the
GPS surveillance in Jones, it does not target any particular person.
Instead, it routinely collects information from the streets in the event
that the camera’s images reveal a crime, a threat to public safety or
capture evidence later needed for a criminal investigation.226
The problem with this objection is that it ignores the ways in which
general collection of evidence can bring the state one step away from
a targeted investigation and undermine Fourth Amendment interests
even before it reaches that targeting stage. Consider, for example, a
hypothetical police program which uses a thermal imager to collect
heat measurements from all houses in a particular region in the event
that police, at a later time, decide to search the information for
evidence of marijuana-growing heat lamps or other evidence of
criminal activity that might be found in the heat measurements. If, as
the Supreme Court ruled in Kyllo, police engage in a search when
they point a thermal imaging device at a single house they suspect of
housing marijuana, they must also engage in a search when they point
that device at many houses and lack any particular suspicion about
the residents of those houses. Even if they do not intend to examine
the heat measurements they collect until some unspecified later date
and are not sure what they will find, they will still have crossed the
line that, according to Kyllo, makes their investigatory activity a
search.227 Their general search has collected evidence from the
interior of a home that they could not otherwise have obtained
except by entry into the home. Likewise, if instead of attaching a
GPS unit to a particular car as they did in Jones, police surreptitiously
tacked such units onto hundreds of cars parked in a city sidewalk to
see (at some unspecified later time) if any of them moved in patterns
characteristic of a drug dealer or purchaser, it is hard to see why the

225. See Keith Proctor, The Great Surveillance Boom, CNNMONEY (Apr. 26, 2013, 4:56
PM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/26/video-surveillance-bostonbombings (documenting the challenges of using video surveillance to investigate and
prevent incidents such as the Boston Marathon and London subway bombings).
226. See, e.g., Allison Linn, Post 9/11, Surveillance Cameras Everywhere, NBCNEWS
(Aug. 23, 2011, 7:38 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44163852/ns/businessus_business/t/post-surveillance-cameras-everywhere (asserting that officials typically
use security cameras not to catch terrorists, but to gather evidence of wrongdoing
and apprehend common criminals); Proctor, supra note 225 (observing that cameras
do little to prevent crime and instead aid in collecting evidence on criminals once a
crime has already occurred).
227. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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general version of such an investigation would be any less a search
than the targeted variant that actually occurred in Jones. Indeed,
some courts have argued that it was this type of general surveillance
that the Supreme Court in Knotts suggested would be especially
problematic.228 In Knotts, the Court stated that while it was not a
search to track a driver on public roads with use of a single beeper, it
might be a search if police used such technology to conduct “dragnettype” surveillance involving “twenty-four hour surveillance of any
citizen of this country.”229 Consequently, if video or other recording
of remote activities is a search when it targets a particular individual,
it should be just as much a Fourth Amendment search when police
record many individuals’ activities and movement before (even long
before) they decide upon whom to focus.
That does not mean, however, that police absolutely need a
warrant or individualized suspicion to record activity in public
space.230 As Christopher Slobogin argued, courts analyzing video
surveillance could adapt certain aspects of their case law on
roadblocks, where courts have relaxed warrant and individualized
suspicion requirements; in these circumstances, they nevertheless
insisted that officials incorporate privacy protections into their
searches.231 Likewise, as argued previously, if obtaining a warrant is
impossible for police using ongoing video surveillance, they might
instead have to satisfy the kind of “constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant”232 that the Supreme Court has sometimes
demanded in certain school or workplace search cases, or other
situations where officials are using searches to meet a need beyond
ordinary law enforcement purposes.233 In these cases, instead of
228. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 & n.6 (deciding the case on a trespassory
standard but noting that under a reasonable expectation of privacy standard, Knotts
indicates that “dragnet-type law enforcement practices,” like those involved in GPS
tracking, might be problematic (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284
(1983))).
229. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–85.
230. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (explaining that warrant and
probable cause requirements may not apply to certain types of searches or police
activities because such requirements are impractical under the circumstances); see
also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–41 (1985) (dispensing with the warrant
and probable cause requirements in school settings, but refusing to lower the
standard to that applicable in the prison setting).
231. Slobogin, supra note 38, at 288–90.
232. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981).
233. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 664–65 (1995)
(finding mandatory drug testing of student athletes constitutional); Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–61, 664–68 (1989) (upholding drug
testing for hiring and promoting employees for certain U.S. Customs Service
positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606, 620–21, 624 (1988)
(“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to
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requiring that police have individualized suspicion, the Supreme
Court has required other, system-wide privacy protections. These
protections often emphasize (1) standardization, (2) unintrusiveness,
and (3) clear necessity given a serious security risk.234 This ensures
that officers have minimal discretion in their searches and that the
searches are brief, reveal little information, and can often be avoided
easily; given the obvious necessity, determination by a neutral
magistrate would be excessive under the circumstance.235 While this
Article does not explore how such “warrant substitutes,” which have
typically applied outside of the criminal context, would apply to
police use of public surveillance to pursue law enforcement
objectives, such an adaptation is possible.
Classifying video
surveillance as a search does not mean that it will be an option only
when police already have the probable cause that they believe the
video surveillance itself will give them.
B. The Objection that the Test Leaves Government with Too Much
Opportunity for Unjustified Surveillance
1. Expanding the definition of a “search” to cover other privacy intrusions
by government
While this Article argues for an extension of the Fourth
Amendment to cover public surveillance, there is potentially a
significant amount of public surveillance that the proposed test
would not cover. Consider, for example, a situation in which a police
officer decides to spend an hour following a person whom she
notices traveling down the street. Imagine that, while doing so, the
officer snaps a picture or takes some video footage with an iPhone or
digital camera, but does not use an optical zoom lens to magnify the
camera’s image. While such image capture would involve recording,
the officer would not be recording remote activities; she would not be
recording events outside of her presence. Nor would she be
engaging in the functional equivalent of remote recording when she
engages in close observation only of events within her field of view.
For some scholars, judges, or lawyers, this limit on Fourth
Amendment coverage may well be unjustified. Indeed, Christopher
ensure safety, like its . . . operation of a government office, school, or prison, . . . may
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”);
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–41 (explaining that a warrant requirement and a “reasonable
grounds” for suspicion standard would both be inappropriate to maintaining order
in schools).
234. Blitz, supra note 45, at 1457–58.
235. Id.
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Slobogin presented a thoughtful case for defining a Fourth
Amendment search more broadly than presented in this Article.236
More specifically, he offered two types of arguments for a broader
definition of “search”: one argument focused on interpreting the
Fourth Amendment itself and the other in a suggested surveillance
statute which, because it is a statute, may cover more territory than
the Fourth Amendment itself.237
Slobogin’s argument about the Fourth Amendment’s coverage is
largely based on the notion that the core purpose of the Amendment
is to protect what the Supreme Court has said that it protects since
Katz—namely, individuals’ actual and reasonable expectations of
privacy.238 Understanding the scope of the Amendment’s protection
therefore requires understanding what these expectations are. As
Slobogin has argued in an article co-authored by Joel Schumacher,
this is a task that demands not merely armchair reflection, but
collection of evidence about how Americans actually think about
their privacy.239 Based on this work, he wrote that individuals expect
far more privacy than the Supreme Court has recognized in its
Fourth Amendment cases, finding, for example, that video
surveillance of the kind that appears to be outside the Supreme
Court’s definition of a search is more intrusive than investigatory
methods that the Court has labeled a search.240 In short, he argued
that the Court has refused to categorize as searches “a vast array of
investigative techniques” that clearly threaten individuals’ widely
shared expectations of privacy, including public surveillance
techniques people clearly view as invasive.241
236. See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 13–15 (2012) (suggesting that courts define a Fourth Amendment
“search” as a layman would and that a proportionality principle should apply when
determining the necessity of a warrant or other protective measures).
237. See generally id. at 5–32 (analyzing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
tests, redefining “search,” laying out a statutory scheme, and commenting on the
proposed provisions).
238. Id. at 5–6, 9–13 (rejecting property as the best foundation for privacy laws
and advocating for a broader definition akin to Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy standard); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 217 (framing the issue in terms
of a right to anonymity).
239. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 159, at 732 (explaining the need for
empirical study and reflection on this issue); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 271–
72, 275–80 (detailing a further study similar to that conducted by Slobogin and
Schumacher).
240. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 211, at 33, 110–13 (noting that in many cases, “a
wide chasm exists between the Court’s holdings and our subjects’ intrusiveness
rankings”); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 271–72, 275–80 (detailing his more
recent empirical study).
241. SLOBOGIN, supra note 211, at 31–32.
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Slobogin’s statutory proposal is even more extensive.242 The
definition of “search,” in a well-drafted surveillance law, he argued,
should cover any “effort by government to find or discern evidence of
unlawful conduct.”243 It does not matter whether a police officer
looks for such evidence with the aid of technology or “with the naked
eye.”244 “The officer who watches an individual walking down the
street to see what transpires is conducting a search under this
definition whether she does so with her unaided vision, binoculars,
closed-circuit television, or a drone.”245 Slobogin emphasized that
focusing on a statutory formulation freed him to “go[] beyond
anything the Fourth Amendment requires, in either scope or
detail.”246 He suggested, however, that this model statute might also
help guide and sharpen thinking about Fourth Amendment rules for
public surveillance.247
Such a broad definition of a search certainly has some advantages.
It is, as Slobogin and other scholars observed,248 closer in many
respects to the way a layperson would define the word “search.”249 In
common usage, a person is typically described as “searching” for
something when he is engaged in a focused attempt to find it,
regardless of whether he is attempting to do so in a house or an open
fields or whether he has any sophisticated technology to aid him.250 A
person can search for a coin dropped on the sidewalk, for example,
simply by scanning his surroundings. Moreover, this broad definition
of a search deprives unscrupulous—or heavily pressured—
government officials of the temptation to circumvent Fourth
Amendment requirements simply by shifting to technologies or
strategies that are unfamiliar to the courts. Under Slobogin’s all242. See Slobogin, supra note 236, at 16–34 (expounding on the definitions and
substantive rules for various types of searches).
243. Id. at 17.
244. Id. at 18.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 5.
247. See id. at 4–5 (indicating that one purpose of his article was to resolve debates
about which Fourth Amendment theories might serve as alternatives to the “mosaic
theory”).
248. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
768 (1994) (arguing that “scanning [a] crowd,” even in public, counts as a “search,”
but that such a search is clearly constitutional); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56
MERCER L. REV. 507, 544 (2005) (arguing that search and seizure “are (and were, at
the time of the founding) ordinary, commonplace words” and should “bear that
ordinary meaning”).
249. Id. at 13, 17.
250. See Search Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/search (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (defining “search” as “look[ing] into
or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover something”).
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methods-covered definition, officials cannot hope to free themselves
from legal restraints by substituting far-away drone observation for
trespassory GPS tracking or by foregoing advanced surveillance
technology and instead using more old fashioned methods of
tracking a driver. No matter what methods they use to track or watch
a person over time, the Fourth Amendment will cover their
investigatory observations.
The problem with such a broad definition of a “search,” however, is
that if it were made the basis of a constitutional rule, it would likely
impose Fourth Amendment constraints on virtually every observation
that police make. Simply by noticing and watching an event that
seems, to an officer, to merit closer attention, that officer would place
himself on Fourth Amendment territory. This, however, is a
counterintuitive way to think about how the Fourth Amendment
operates. The Amendment’s language is not designed to constrain
everything a police officer sees or focuses her attention on, however
temporarily or casually. Instead, it is written to cover a particular
subset of police activity—namely “searches” of particular targets:
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”251 It makes sense, therefore, to
treat as a search circumstances in which police enter, or otherwise
physically explore, a person, her house, or her documents and
property. It also makes sense to treat as a search circumstances in
which police use technology to investigate an object without touching
or entering it, for example, by magnifying it or creating a continuous
record of its activity from a remote location.
One alternative is to limit the definition of search by focusing on a
police officer’s motives rather than his methods. Christopher
Slobogin’s definition of search, for instance, arguably includes a
motive requirement because it technically applies not to every
observation a government official makes, but only to those
observations that are part of “[a]n effort . . . to find or discern
unlawful conduct.”252 But it is not clear how such a motive
requirement would place any significant limitation on Fourth
Amendment coverage. The central mission of the police is to watch
for and respond to unlawful conduct, and when they attend to a
person or event while they are on duty, it is likely that a court will
presume they are doing so as part of their job description. In fact,
without such a presumption, the line between searches and nonsearches will rest on the outcome of a difficult inquiry into hidden
251. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
252. Slobogin, supra note 236, at 17.

BLITZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FUTURE

11/2/2013 12:26 PM

75

subjective motives—of precisely the sort that the Supreme Court has
been intent on avoiding in the context of determining whether
police have probable cause for a traffic stop and automobile search.253
A more modest expansion for the test described above would apply
Fourth Amendment limitations to all recordings, or record creation
in general, rather than covering only remote police recording. Even
when an officer simply snaps an iPhone photo of what is directly in
front of her, one might argue, she engages in a search. The Fourth
Amendment might give her more leeway to conduct such a simple,
relatively unintrusive search than it gives a team of officers operating
a drone-based camera or collecting and reviewing footage from a citywide surveillance system. But such leeway would still be limited by
search and seizure protection that would, for example, forbid
capturing iPhone pictures of people or events that she has no reason
to suspect have any connection to criminal activity.
There is, however, a problem with a rule that makes any police
observation a search as soon as it is accompanied by even the simplest
kind of record creation. Police activity that precisely mirrors that
which individuals engage in every day would be converted into a
matter of constitutional law. Thanks to the miniaturization of
cameras and their incorporation into the cell phones, individuals
carry cameras with them almost everywhere, and there are few
activities in public spaces that are off-limits to photo and video
recording. In fact, police have often found themselves being video
recorded by citizens wielding iPhone cameras or other recording
devices, and a number of appellate courts have found that individuals
have a First Amendment right to record police in this way.254 It is
conceivable that the same individual who has a constitutional right to
record police officers also has a constitutional right to avoid being
video recorded by the same police officers they are video recording.
253. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (asserting that the
Court has never invalidated a Fourth Amendment search based on an officer’s
subjective motive and that the Fourteenth Amendment provides the appropriate
protections for challenging discriminatory police behavior).
254. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that an Illinois eavesdropping statute that would ban nonconsensual audiorecording of public officials likely fails intermediate scrutiny and infringes on First
Amendment rights); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (emphasizing
that there is a constitutional right to record police in the course of their public
duties because public recording of government officials can play an essential role in
stimulating “the free discussion of governmental affairs” and protection of freedom
(quoting Mills v. Alabama 384 U.S. 214, 217 (1966))); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[t]he First Amendment protects
the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property,
and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest,” including a right “to
photograph or videotape police conduct”).
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But such a rule has problematic implications. Unlike remote
recording with drone cameras or citywide video systems, using an
iPhone to snap a photograph of one’s surroundings is, in many
respects, simply a modern form of note taking. As Professor Seth
Kreimer wrote while arguing for extending First Amendment
protections to image capture, “[r]ecorded images can serve the same
function” as the “sense impressions or . . . sketches in [a] diary.”255 It
seems unlikely that the Fourth Amendment places police on
constitutional territory every time they supplement their own
perception or memory in the way that ordinary citizens do every day.
In fact, the desire to avoid such a result was likely what caused the
Supreme Court to note in Kyllo that use of sense enhancement
technology probably would not count as a search when that
technology was “in general public use,” unless it were aimed at a
house or other private environment.256 The “general public use” test
has been the target of scholarly criticism,257 and critics are right to
argue that the Supreme Court would invite chaos and confusion if
what counted as a search changed each year as new technologies and
cultural practices transformed the way people interact with public
space.258 But whatever its flaws as a black letter law test, the general
public use requirement at least captures a powerful intuition about
Fourth Amendment law: it should not subject all police observation
and record-creation to heightened judicial scrutiny. The question
rather, is what kind of police monitoring in public must be subject to
Fourth Amendment limits and what kind of garden-variety police
observation remains free of such limits. It is probably implausible to
255. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right To Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 380 (2011).
256. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
257. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 211, at 57–58, 62–65 (positing that public use is
a blurry line that could refer either to how easily the general public can acquire the
technology or to how frequently the general public uses the technology); Douglas
Adkins, The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment “General Public Use” Standard
for Emerging Technologies but Fails To Define It: Kyllo v. United States, 27 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 245, 262 (2002) (criticizing the Kyllo “general public use” doctrine as completely
unworkable and asserting that “the Court must have intended something . . . other
than actual use by the public”).
258. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment:
The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996) (noting that “[t]he
type of technology the public can possess may change with surprising speed”); Tracey
Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the TwentyFirst Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 105 (2002) (“[W]hether a particular device is in general
public use should have no impact on Fourth Amendment analysis.”); Christopher
Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules
Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2002) (observing
that courts will have “to deal with the rapid pace of technological development in
deciding whether something is in general public use”).
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insist that police be free from Fourth Amendment limits any time
they use a technology that is generally available to private
citizens: That would mean that, even as enhancements to aerial
drones and GPS units make these devices a greater threat to
privacy, their use by police would paradoxically become subject
to less Fourth Amendment oversight—as long as private citizens
are able to purchase and use such surveillance technology for
their own purposes.
Use of these remote recording technologies should count a Fourth
Amendment search, but this is not because these technologies are—
for the moment at least—less widely used, or available to private
citizens, than SmartPhone cameras. Rather, it is because remote
recording technologies allow police to do something they cannot
easily do with a SmartPhone, which is to generate a “precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements”259—a digital
archive they can later use to engage in a frame-by-frame search.
The government might conceivably subject U.S. citizens to such a
dragnet investigation even without automated recording technology
that can follow an individual far from where an officer is positioned.
But doing so is likely to be costly and burdensome for police. As
Justice Alito stated in Jones, tracking an individual over a period of
days without GPS technology is likely to require significantly more
man power and police resources and is likely to be a far more
complex operation.260 As Justice Breyer explained in Illinois v.
Lidster,261 such an investigation may be in less need of
constitutional restraint because its costs make it subject to heavy
practical restraints.262
2.

More general technology-centered approaches
Other scholars have explored ways of defining searches in public
space that are less expansive but still arguably cover more ground
than the proposed definition offered in this Article. Another set of
recent and promising proposals, for example, come from scholars
who argued for a technology-based approach to what counts as a
search. In contrast, however, they analyze it at a higher-level of
259. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
260. Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
261. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
262. See id. at 426 (explaining that there is little cause for concern that its approval
of police information stops would lead to “unreasonable” worry about “proliferation
of police checkpoints” because “[p]ractical considerations—namely, limited police
resources and community hostility to related traffic tieups—seem likely to inhibit any
such proliferation”).
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generality than in this Article, which focuses on public recording
(remote or otherwise) and certain types of magnification and
amplification. Professors David Gray and Danielle Citron, for
example, argued for a “technology-centered approach” to determine
which investigations count as Fourth Amendment searches.263 Their
test would classify any technology as a search if it “has the capacity to
facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that intrude
upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.”264 Among the
technologies that enable such “pervasive surveillance” are “aerial
drones, GPS-enabled tracking, [and] digital dossiers.”265 These
technologies, Gray and Citron claim, raise the same specter of
authoritarianism for modern citizens that “broad and
indiscriminate use of physically invasive searches and seizures”
did for our predecessors.266
Another similar approach that inspired Gray and Citron’s proposal
is Susan Freiwald’s proposal. Freiwald stated that courts can mark a
line between searches and non-searches with a four-factor test that
the Supreme Court and other courts have developed over the last
four decades in cases addressing wiretapping or video surveillance in
homes, offices, or other private spaces.267 Under this test, a method
of public surveillance would count as a search when it is characterized
by each (or perhaps, most) of the following elements: it is (1)
hidden, in that the target is unaware of it; (2) intrusive, in the sense
that it “affords law enforcement agents access to things people
consider private”; (3) continuous, in that it represents an ongoing
“series of intrusions” rather than a single intrusion by the state; and
(4) indiscriminate, in that it “gathers up more information than
necessary to establish guilt.”268 GPS surveillance, she argued, will
typically count as a search under these criteria because GPS units are
typically hidden, record myriad details about a person’s movements
and activities, do so over an extended period of time, and gather
263. Gray & Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5).
264. See id. (manuscript at 5) (elaborating that technology that qualifies as a
search under this test would then be subject to Fourth Amendment warrant and
reasonableness requirements).
265. Id. (manuscript at 27).
266. Id.
267. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶¶ 9–11 (outlining the details of
the Four Factor Test, its derivation from case law, and how it promotes the goals of
the Fourth Amendment); Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32 (summarizing how
courts essentially apply a four-factor test when analyzing what Fourth Amendment
protections should apply to a given investigatory method).
268. Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32; see also Freiwald, First Principles, supra
note 32, ¶¶ 61–69 (adding that courts could apply lesser standards to those
surveillance methods that do not share all four factors).
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much information unrelated to criminal activity.269 Surveillance by
an unseen drone would count as a search for the same reason. Video
surveillance by street cameras is not hidden to the same extent, as
pedestrians can often see the cameras on buildings or corners, but it
otherwise shares the features that make GPS tracking and drone
surveillance a search.
Interestingly, the earlier cases that Freiwald relies upon, which
applied similar principles to cases of wiretapping and video
surveillance, did not use these criteria to determine whether a certain
investigatory technique was a search or a non-search. Rather, courts
employed these factors to justify imposing certain “heightened
procedural hurdles,” beyond a showing of probable cause, on certain
types of unusually threatening electronic searches.270 Still, although
these criteria were used to determine what hurdles the government
had to overcome to make a search reasonable, they can be adapted to
the task of determining what public monitoring should count as a
search at all. Although police surveillance in public has traditionally
been entirely outside the Fourth Amendment’s coverage, when it
raises the same risks for privacy and autonomy as the most worrisome
forms of inside surveillance, such as wiretapping or video recording
from cameras hidden in homes or businesses, then it makes sense to
bring such public surveillance into Fourth Amendment territory so
that courts can guard against its possible abuses. Thus, when public
surveillance is hidden, intrusive, continuous, and indiscriminate
(under Freiwald’s test) or capable of broad and indiscriminate
surveillance (under Gray and Citron’s), it is—just as wiretapping and
bugging—subject to constitutional limits.
Such an approach has two advantages that might, to some, make it
seem preferable to a test that focuses on recording capacity,
magnification, or some other specific technological feature. First, it
has the virtue of offering a single standard that courts can apply not
only to surveillance in public spaces, but to all kinds of wide-scale
government surveillance, from wiretapping, to thermal imaging and
GPS tracking. Second, like Slobogin’s all-methods-covered approach
above, Gray, Citron, and Freiwald’s approaches are broad enough
269. Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32.
270. Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶ 10; see, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (developing constitutional rules for electronic eavesdropping in
part with a focus on that technology’s “inherent dangers”). As Judge Posner noted in
applying such criteria to video surveillance, such surveillance was “inherently
indiscriminate” and “could be grossly abused—to eliminate personal privacy as
understood in modern Western societies.” United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882
(7th Cir. 1984).
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that they easily apply limits to alternative technologies (or low-tech
analogues) that the government employs to circumvent Fourth
Amendment limitations. For example, if police try to circumvent a
Fourth Amendment restriction on remote recording by sending out
officers to continuously record activities on dashboard cameras and
then storing them for later analysis, Gray and Citron’s test would
likely still give courts all of the doctrine they need to classify such
recording as a search based on its potential for broad and
indiscriminate investigation of citizens’ public movements or
actions.271 Freiwald’s test would also likely classify such widespread
recording as a search, because it is intrusive, continuous,
indiscriminate (and, if people do not see the cameras in the police
cars, also hidden).272 Courts thus would not have to analogize this
multi-officer use of individual recording devices to hidden
surveillance from drones or street cameras.273

271. See Gray & Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5, 12–13, 36) (noting that
their technology-based approach to the Fourth Amendment should serve as a guide
to prevent unfettered government recording of the public and limit “broad
programs of indiscriminate surveillance”).
272. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶¶ 9–11 (basing her test on video
surveillance cases). Police could use video surveillance technology to continuously
record the public in much the same way that drones might. See Freiwald, Four Factor
Test, supra note 32 (applying the four-factor test and concluding that law
enforcement officials should seek a warrant before engaging in GPS tracking).
273. Such general approaches offer yet another possible benefit: they may be
broad enough to cover government collection and analysis of third-party images and
videos. Third-party video records could conceivably provide officials with all the data
they need to create detailed archives of individuals’ activities. Much of the video
used in the Boston Marathon investigation, for example, came from the video
cameras of private businesses and individuals filming the Boston Marathon (or the
aftermath of the bombing) with their own smart phone cameras. Kelly, supra note 1.
Third-party records could be of similar benefit in location tracking. As Stephen
Henderson has written, location data has immense value to private businesses, since
it allows them to discover customer habits and patterns. Stephen E. Henderson,
Learning From All Fifty States: How To Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs
To Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373,
383–84 (2006). For example, “a business would probably like to know that customers
spend an average of fifteen minutes in the store.” Id. at 383–84. Furthermore, a
third party’s natural interest in location-tracking, combined with the locationtracking capacities “inherent in [cell phone] technology,” make it likely that police
will find all the information they need to track an individual in records already
collected by private parties. Id. at 385. It is thus understandable that the concurring
justices in Jones were worried not only about officials using public cameras or
government-installed GPS devices, but also about government collection and analysis
of third-party-generated data. Justice Alito, for example, noted that “[m]any
motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that permit a central station
to ascertain the car’s location at any time” and that “cell phones and other wireless
devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the location of users.”
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Sotomayor explained that a coherent approach to privacy in
public may require the Supreme Court “to reconsider the premise that an individual
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There are, however, two disadvantages to the more abstract
approach. One is the opposite of the advantage discussed above.
The same generality that allows these approaches to more easily cover
a wide range of investigatory techniques also makes it less predictable
which techniques will be covered by the Fourth Amendment.
Consider, for example, some of the questions courts would face in
assessing whether certain video- or image-capture technology is
capable of broad and indiscriminate use (under Gray and Citron’s
test) or “intrusive” (under Freiwald’s). In defining how broad,
indiscriminate or intrusive a technology is, should courts consider
any technological or administrative safeguards (e.g., a rigorously
enforced restriction on access) that a police department builds into
its video surveillance system?274 Should they consider use of a
surveillance technology to be a search if that technology is relatively
unthreatening in its typical form but can be easily repurposed so as to
let police engage in more intrusive searches? Do police engage in a
search, for example, if they use recording systems that blur faces, but
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.” Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Conceivably, a government investigative method that draws on other parties’ video
footage rather than the government’s might still count as a method that facilitates
“broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance” under Gray and Citron’s test. Gray
& Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5). Indeed, Gray and Citron suggested that
their approach would at least cover situations where a private party was acting as a
state agent, and “that in most cases where government leveraging of private data
reservoirs would raise [Fourth Amendment] concerns, one or more of the[] tests of
state agency” would very likely be met. Id. (manuscript at 45–46). Of course, such a
state agency test would likely solve the same problem under the narrower approach
suggested in this Article.
If it did not do so, and Justice Sotomayor thus remained correct that effective
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy requires a reformulation of the third-party
doctrine, then such a change to the third-party doctrine would not be sufficient, by
itself, to subject government recording of public activities (or analysis of others’
recordings) to Fourth Amendment rules. The Supreme Court would also need some
rationale and guidance providing why and when video footage captured in open
spaces could implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests even when it occurs in
public and observable space. After all, if we do not have any account of why it might
be constitutionally problematic for the government to routinely videotape public
activities by itself, it would not be clear why it is any more problematic for it to obtain
the same information from others. We thus need some approach, like the one this
Article offers, to explain when and why government recording of citizens’ activities
would cross a constitutional line; the approach would also have to explain when and
why gathering the same information from third parties’ recordings might be
unconstitutional. Although a more general technology-centered approach can
certainly serve this role, so too can a narrower test that subjects only remote
recording and certain instances of magnification or amplification to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.
274. See Gray & Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5) (describing its test as one
that looks to the potential uses and abuses of the technology as a basis for incurring
Fourth Amendment scrutiny); Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32 (considering
potential limits on GPS tracking).
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where police can easily remove the blurring? Or when they use a
recording system that can work only if a particular police officer is
operating it, but which can easily be reprogrammed to record
continuously and automatically?
Gray, Citron, and Freiwald’s abstract approaches are also
problematic in that it is likely to over-expand Fourth Amendment
coverage. Freiwald’s proposal, for example, is likely to sweep in more
police work than the test proposed by this Article because there are
kinds of public surveillance that arguably satisfy all four elements of
Freiwald’s test but involve neither recording nor substantial
magnification of otherwise invisible details on a person, paper, or
effect. For example, imagine that an officer in an unmarked vehicle
becomes suspicious of a car driving in front of him and decides to
follow a few cars behind on the road for a period of ten or fifteen
minutes. There is a good chance this counts as a “search” under
Freiwald’s test.275 While the officer’s car is visible, he does not intend
to alert the driver ahead that the government is watching her. So the
officer’s observations are hidden. The officer’s activities are certainly
also continuous. The officer is gathering at least some information
about actions that are unlikely to reveal criminal activity. Whether
this activity is sufficiently intrusive to be a search is unclear, but
without additional guidance for answering this question, courts
facing it might encounter the same difficulty that the Supreme Court
encountered in Jones. Like the proposal in this Article, Freiwald’s test
avoids making intensity or duration the key determinants of whether
an investigation is a search.276 Instead, Freiwald directed courts to
apply these factors to each “method of surveillance.”277 So courts will
have to decide how to define—and judge—the method of
surveillance being used in a situation in which the only surveillance
technology an officer is using to watch someone is the car he is
driving. It is possible that if courts conclude that such observation is
typically non-intrusive, they will define it as a non-search even if one
can imagine more intrusive variants of it. But courts certainly have
more leeway under this test than they do under the test proposed in

275. See Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32 (viewing GPS tracking as a search
and therefore potentially any attempt by police to track drivers as a search for the
same reasons).
276. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶ 69 (focusing instead on the
continuous nature of a search, not on a specific length of time, and incorporating
three additional factors into the test).
277. See id. ¶¶ 50, 60 (stating that the courts should also make clear
decisions on what the Constitution demands before law enforcement begins
using new technologies).
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this Article to classify as a “search” visual observation by police officers
that is unaided by cameras or other technology.
Still, the approaches offered by Gray, Citron, and Freiwald might
well end up leading courts to define the Fourth Amendment territory
that the proposal here covers. Remote recording is certainly capable
of the broad and indiscriminate use that, for Gray and Citron, is the
hallmark of a Fourth Amendment search. Remote recording is also,
as a general matter, likely to be hidden from the view of the target;
the police officer doing the recording is not present (and the device
doing the recording is often not visible). It is certainly continuous,
and it indiscriminately captures significant amounts of information
unrelated to crime. So it also satisfies Freiwald’s test. High-level
magnification of reading materials or other items we assume are
private is also likely to occur without our knowledge and to be
intrusive and indiscriminate.278
Thus, it is plausible to view the proposal set forth in this Article as a
specific application of the approaches discussed by Gray, Citron, and
Freiwald, which advocate that the Supreme Court count as a search
all public surveillance that eliminates the possibility for “private or
anonymous action” in public space.279 Recording remote events and
close magnification of details are only two examples of surveillance
technologies that raise such concerns.
Yet Courts might offer greater clarity—not just to law enforcement
agents but to other courts—if they start with such abstract criteria,
but rather with a test that marks remote recording and high-level
magnification as searches. This more modest approach also adheres
more closely to the Supreme Court’s own precedent on surveillance
in public spaces.280 As noted above, the Supreme Court has already
stated in its tracking cases that location-monitoring technology may
count as a search when used in conjunction with dragnet
information-gathering devices; this might include any device, like
GPS, that records a person’s movements from one place to another.
It has noted in its aerial surveillance cases that even when police
observe a home’s curtilage or a business’s open premises from a place
where the public has a right to be, their surveillance might still be a
278. Whether it is continuous is less clear. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1383–84
(indicating that magnification of images caught on video surveillance implicates
privacy concerns, even if the Supreme Court refuses to lend much credence to such
concerns); see also Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶¶ 69–70 (examining the
continuousness requirement in relation to e-mails).
279. Blitz, supra note 45, at 1446.
280. See e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (noting that people
can reasonably expect reduced privacy on, for example, public roadways).
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search when it reveals intimate details about a person’s life.281
Building on such precedent in future cases on public surveillance,
the Supreme Court may eventually build the framework that marks
particular investigatory techniques as searches or non-searches based
upon their general level of intrusiveness or their capacity to
indiscriminately and continuously capture information. If and when
such a framework emerges, this might also allow a link between the
Court’s emerging Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on surveillance
in public spaces and its jurisprudence on surveillance of Internet and
phone communications. Nevertheless, even if the Supreme Court
takes a more cautious and minimalist approach, there is a
technological form- or design-based approach that allows it to
proceed in extending Fourth Amendment protection to public
surveillance.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, judges seeking to apply Fourth Amendment law to
emerging surveillance technologies have faced a dilemma. On the
one hand, if they continue to insist on the simple rule that public
space is a Fourth Amendment-free zone, they seem to betray Fourth
Amendment purposes.282 While the Fourth Amendment does not, as
the Supreme Court noted in Katz, establish a “general constitutional
‘right to privacy,’”283 it does protect us from government fishing
expeditions whereby police invade the private realms of our life in
search of details that would justify subjecting us to an arrest or other
seizure.284 Police cannot arbitrarily sift through the items in our
house or the documents in our briefcase,285 so it is not clear why they
should be able to create, and then sift through, video frames of
people’s day-to-day movements through public space, especially
because even acts that occur in a public space may betray aspects of
their lives that are deeply private and personal. In fact, roadside
cameras or drones might capture evidence not only of citizens’
281. See supra notes 124–133, 207 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that the Court must retreat from an idea of privacy as
complete secrecy); id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that
the majority’s trespassory standard could lead to “incongruous results”).
283. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
284. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (explaining that the
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to preserve the privacy of the home
and safeguard against arbitrary government invasions).
285. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that the government cannot arbitrarily
search a person’s “houses, papers, and effects” without probable cause); see also
Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (prohibiting “arbitrary invasions by the government”).
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movements, but of their private thoughts. They might give hints
about personal internal demons individuals are struggling with when
they visit a psychotherapist, twelve-step group, or library. This is
especially true if the state not only has a record of its citizens’
movements, but also video footage that captures facial expressions,
demeanor, gait, and perhaps (with powerful magnification) the
documents held in their hands.
On the other hand, if courts extend the Fourth Amendment into
the realm of the public and visible, it is not at all clear how far this
extension should go. It seems wrong to say that every glance by
police or every event they observe in the street suddenly activates a
constitutional force field protecting the subject of their attention; it
also seems wrong to assume that if police look a bit closer—whether
by staring for a longer time, donning a better pair of glasses, or using
their binoculars or iPhone—Fourth Amendment protections
immediately apply. The concurring opinions in United States v. Jones
rightly did not let this difficulty deter them from concluding that the
Fourth Amendment applies to public space, but they also did not find
a way to resolve the issue.286 Rather, they assumed that there is a
vague, yet-to-be-identified line between public surveillance that is
sufficiently brief to avoid judicial scrutiny of any kind and longer
surveillance that might count as a “search.”287
This Article has proposed a way out of the dilemma. First, whether
public surveillance counts as a Fourth Amendment search depends
not on its duration or intensity, but rather on whether it uses
technology that attempts to do what the Fourth Amendment was
meant to stop: dragnet surveillance that creates records of activities
that police can then sift through for evidence that might justify
subjecting us to the coercive powers of the state. In short, this means
that the Fourth Amendment should first bar the government from
recording with technologies that inescapably follow citizens through
public space and record them remotely wherever they can be
found—no matter how far they may be from the sight or hearing of a
police officer. Whether that recording lasts only a few seconds or a
month, it is still a search because, by turning it on, police are
286. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would not assume that
all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”); id.
at 960–61, 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the determining
factors for Fourth Amendment protection should include the duration of the
intrusion and reasonable expectations of privacy, not the presence of a physical
trespass).
287. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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subjecting citizens to a technology that is capable of creating a digital
archive of evidence about their lives. To be sure, its brevity may be
relevant to the question of whether it is reasonable. Courts may
decide that such brief recording is unlikely to threaten people and
should thus be permitted even if police have a level of suspicion that
is far lower than probable cause. When the video recording targets
no one at all and instead simply sweeps in all people and events that
occur in a given area, then courts might likewise give police more
leeway to record, as long as it is clear that any attempt to use these
recordings to trace the path of a particular person triggers the same
warrant (or other) requirements that would limit targeted
surveillance in the first instance.

